Evaluation of spacecraft technology programs (effects on communication satellite business ventures), volume 1 by Fishman, J. et al.
NASA Contractor Report 174978
Evaluation of Spacecraft Technology Programs
(Effects on Communication Satellite Business
Ventures)—Volume I
Joel S. Greenburg, Carole Gaelick
Princeton Synergetics, Inc.
Princeton, New Jersey
Marshall Kaplan
Spacetech Inc.
State College, Pennsylvania
Janis Fishman
Princeton Synergetics, Inc.
Princeton, New Jersey
and
Charles Hopkins
Econ, Inc.
San Jose, California
September 1985
Prepared for the
Lewis Research Center
Under Contract NAS 3-23886
fVI/NSA
National Aeronautics and
Space
(NASA-CB-17U978) E V A L U A T I O N Of SPACECfiAFT NflTT^TT
TECHNOLOGY PBOGfiAJSS (EFFECTS ON e^f>^AJff H86-16451
COMMUNICATION SATELLITE BUSINESS VENTURES)
VOLUME 1 Final Eeport (Princeton unrlac:
Synergetics, lac,) , 1
 £6 p flC AC9/MF A01 . G3/32 0?927
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19860006981 2020-03-20T16:20:37+00:00Z
SUMMARY
Commercial organizations as well as government agencies invest in
spacecraft (S/C) technology prograns that are aimed at increasing
the performance of comunications satellites. "One value of these
programs oust be measured in tens of their impacts on the
financial performance of the business ventures that may
ultimately utilize the connunicaticns satellites. An economic
evaluation and planning capability has been developed and used bo
assess the impact of NASA en-orbit propulsion and space power
programs on typical fixed satellite service (FSS) and direct
broadcast service (DBS) coonunications satellite business
ventures. The developed methodology is based upon a stochastic
financial simulation model (i.e., pQMSAT II) that allows for the
explicit and quantitative consideration of reliability and
various market, performance and cost uncertainties. The Model
developes financial performance measures, including quantitative
risk measures, that allow the impacts of the technology programs
to be determined.
Typical FSS and DBS spin and three-axis stabilized spacecraft
were configured in the absence of NASA technology programs.
These spacecraft were reconfigured taking into account the
anticipated results of NASA specified en-orbit and space power
programs. Nonrecurring and unit recurring costs were estimated
(using the FRIGE cost model) for all of the spacecraft
configurations and financial analyses performed of FSS and DBS
business ventures utilizing thf»5P spacecraft. In general, the
NASA technology programs resulted in spacecraft with increased
capability — this was taken into account in the analysis.
This report describes the developed methodology for assessing the
value of spacecraft technology programs in terms of their impact
on the financial performance of connunications satellite business
ventures. Results of the assessment of NASA specified on-orbit
and space power technology programs are presented for typical FSS
and DBS business ventures. These results are extrapolated to
indicate the potential market for the developed technology and
the possible implications of the programs on spacecraft imports
and exports.
This report consists of two volunes. Volume 1 describes the
methodology and contains the results of the analyses performed
for the en-orbit propulsion and space power technology programs.
Volume 2 contains appendices describing the DCKSAT II Model and
data base and includes user and programmer documentation.
The reported wort vas performed by MB. Carole Gaelic* and Mr.
Joel S. Greenberg, Princeton synergetics, Inc., Or. Marshall
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0.1
An economic evaluation and planning capability was developed
that is appropriate for the evaluation of spacecraft (S/C)
technology programs (such as those associated with space power
and on-orbit propulsion systems) in terns of their impacts on
communications satellite business ventures. Technology
assessments and projections were made and, using the developed
capability, an assessment was made of the impact of NASA
specified S/C technology programs on typical fixed satellite
service (PSS) and direct broadcast service (DBS) communications
satellite business ventures and to U.S. spacecraft markets. The
impacts were assessed in terms of the changes in financial
performance measures such as cash flow, present value of cash
flow and return on investment that may result from the use of the
new and/or improved S/C technology (i.e., ion-thruster on-orbit
propulsion and Gallium Arsenide solar cells).
The establishment of the impacts of technology programs on
communications satellite business ventures requires the
formulation of typical conramications satellite business
ventures, the simulation modeling of these ventures, the
establishment of appropriate business and technology data bases,
and the analysis of the business ventures without and with NASA
investment in S/C technology programs. The formulation of typical
FSS and CBS business ventures included the specification of
services to be provided and the demand for these services,
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sparing arrangements, use of insurance, number of satellites and
desired launch dates, space transportation scenarios, anticipated
launch dates, financial data (i.e., cost, expense, and capital
expenditure data) and S/C attributes without and with the NASA
technology programs. Both spin and three-axis stabilized
configurations were considered. The S/C configurations served as
the basis for cost estimation using the HCA PRICE Model. The S/C
configurations provided inputs to the financial analysis such as
subsystem reliability and the consequences of failures, nunber of
transponders, and recurring and nonrecurring costs. Cost,
demand, timing and other areas of uncertainty were explicitly and
quantitatively considered as were S/C subsystem and launch system
reliabilities. As a result expected values were established for
all financial performance measures as well as explicit and
quantitative measures of risk.
To accomplish the financial analysis, the stochastic
financial simulation model, DGMSAT II, was developed. This Model
can represent a broad range of FSS, DBS and other conmunications
satellite business ventures. The Model is specifically
configured to assess the impacts of the S/C technology and
related programs upon the financial performance of FSS and DBS
business ventures. The DGMSAT II Model is implemented so as to
operate on the IBM-PC (in FORERAN) with input data provided via a
user friendly LOTOS 123 system.
The analysis of a S/C technology program first requires the
formulation of base case communications satellite business
scenario utilizing a base case S/C configuration. S/C attributes
are used to derive nonrecurring and unit recurring cost and the
S/C cost and performance attributes are specified to the DOKSAT
II Model as are other characteristics of the business scenario.
The Model then establishes the financial performance measures of
the business as a function of tine. The effect of S/C technology
programs are assessed by specifying the anticipated results of
the technology program, reconfiguring the S/C utilizing the
afisimpd new level of technology, costing the S/C and specifying
the cost and performance attributes to the DGMSXT II Model. New
financial performance measures are then developed utilizing the
new S/C in the specified business scenario, and these measures
compared with the base case.
Changes in the financial performance measures resulting f ran
the S/C technology programs were used as the basis for judgements
concerning the likelihood of the results of ion-thruster and
Gallium Arsenide solar cell programs being incorporated into spin
and three-axis stabilized S/C used by typical FSS and DBS
business ventures. These estimates were then extrapolated (with
some degree of trepidation because of the limited number of
scenarios considered) to the satellite markets and estimates made
of the likely impacts of U.S. and foreign on-orbit and solar cell
technology programs on the market for D.S. manufactured
satellites.
The developed methodology, and in particular the DOMSAT II
Model, nay be used to evaluate a broad range of program and
policy alternatives. In addition to the evaluation of S/C
technology programs, the Model can be used to assess the impacts
on OGBnunications satellite business ventures of:
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utilizing alternative space transportation systems
Ji.e^ , expendable vs. Reusable)i.
* achieving improved pay load placeoent accuracy.
* different insurance rates as compared with the self-
insurance option explicitly taking into account the
level of risk.
* transportation system technology programs (for example,
low thrust from LEO to GBO; improved upper stage
reliability; etc.).
* space transportation system pricing policies.
* pricing policies for transponders and related services.
* S/C configuration alternatives including sparing
design, nmfcer of active transponders, and on-orbit
life.
* regulatory programs.
The above program and policy impacts may be assessed in terms of
specific business scenarios - i.e. , at the aicro level - and
include explicit and quantitative measures of risk.
0.2
A nurber of conclusions may be drawn from the results of the
previously described analyses. It must be cautioned that a
number of these may be "weak" since they are based upon the
results obtained from the analyses of a very limited number of
business scenarios and S/C configurations.
It is concluded that:
The developed methodology provides the means for
assessing the impacts of S/C technology programs on
coDDunicaticns satellite business ventures. It
provides a quantitative means for establishing
financial impacts that can be used to improve
qualitative judgements with respect to the likelihood
that the resulting technology will gain widespread
acceptance.
The use of ion-thrusters and Galliun Arsenide solar
cells resulting front (ASA technology programs have the
potential of reducing the mass of PSS and DBS s/C. Ihe
BOSS reduction nay be taken in the form of
transportation cost savings (when transportation costs
are in direct proportion to payload BBSS) or the nass
may be replaced so as to increase S/C capability -
i.e., increased reliability, increased S/C expected on-
orbit life, increased lumber of active and/or spare
transponders, etc.
The desirability of and the specific manner in which
Bass savings should be replaced depends upon many
factors including the demand for and price of
transponders, subsystem reliability characteristics,
transportation cost, and regulatory constraints (for
example, maximum allowable power density on ground).
Ihe considered technology improvements lead to
increased nonrecurring and unit recurring costs(relative to base case S/C). A portion of these
increases is the result of increased S/C capability,
refer to Table 1, but the major portion is due to the
incorporation of the new technology.
TABLE 0.1 S/C COST AND CAPABILITY SOMAFY
SPACECRAFT
ESS
BASE CASE
ION-THRDSTER
GA SOLAR CELL
CBS
BASE CASE
ION-TORUSTER
GA SOLAR CELL
EXPECTED
NONREC.
COST (M$)
20.8
44.2
31.0
39.9
75.8
45.3
EXPECTED
RECURRING
COST (M$)
38.6
43.9
38.8
66.9
77.2
65.7
NO. OP
ACTIVE
TRANSP.
16
20
18
3
4
3
WEAROUT
LIFE
(YRS)
8
10
8
7
9
9
The use of the new technology, in general, increases
the profitability of the typical FSS and DBS business
ventures in the long-term. This could not be achieved,
without higher nonrecurring and unit recurring costs,
with an accompanying increase in indebtedness (negative
of cumulative cash flow) in the near-term. The net
effect is an increase in the required investment in the
near-term to achieve an increase in profits in the
long-term. The magnitude of the increase in
indebtedness is primarily due to the nonrecurring cost.
Without reductions in the nonrecurring cost it is
unlikely that the ion-thruster technology will find
quick acceptance - the effect of the increase in ROI
and other financial performance measures is likely to
be_more than of f set by the ef feet _of increased required_
investnent for using a technology that is perceived to
be relatively high risk. This can be altered by
reducing the nonrecurring cost and perceived risk by
undertaking flight demonstration programs as part of
the technology program.
The improved solar cell technology is likely to find
early acceptance because of the increase in financial
performance measures which are not offset by
significant increases in nonrecurring cost.
Since both considered technology programs can offer
significant benefits to connunications satellite
business ventures (and are likely to be utilized if the
nonrecurring cost hurdle can be reduced), foreign
technology developments are important. Since foreign
technology programs similar to the ion-thruster and
Galliua Arsenide solar cell technology programs of NASA
are being conducted it may be concluded that without
comparable O.S. programs, the foreign technology
program results are likely to be incorporated into S/C
design. This will undoubtedly give foreign S/C
manufacturers an advantage over O.S. S/C manufacturers
and may erode O.S. spacecraft markets.
0.3
A number of reconnendations are indicated in the following
paragraphs. These are organized under the general headings of
Technology Programs, Analyses, and Model Improvements.
Technology Programs
* It is recannended that NASA S/C technology programs
include efforts specifically aimed at reducing S/C non-
recurring costs when the technology program (for
example, the ion-thruster program for en-orbit
propulsion) is likely to lead to a substantial increase
in the nonrecurring cost of a S/C utilizing the NASA
developed technology. This is particularly important
since the benefits of the technology program will not
be achieved unless the private sector utilizes the
developed technology. Even though there are long term
financial benefits as a result of the use of the
technology, the near-term increase in indebtedness and
risk may make it unattractive to utilize the technology.
* It is recommended that combinations of technology
programs be analyzed (on-orbit propulsion and space
power programs have been analyzed separately) .
It is reccomended that the analysis be extended to
new spacecraft configurations.
It is reccnmended that other S/C technology programs be
evaluated in terns of their impacts on oonnunications
satellite business ventures. This will provide
quantitative information that will be useful for
formulating an overall S/C technology program.
It is recuinended that the use of the COMSAT II Model
be incorporated as standard procedure into the program
planning and evaluation process.
It is recccmended that other business scenarios and S/C
configurations be considered. Only one FSS and one CBS
business scenario in combination with a spin
stabilized and a three-axis stabilized S/C,
respectively, have been analyzed. To make the results
more robust it is necessary to consider other business
scenarios and S/C configurations.
TO fully appreciate the significance of the impacts of
the technology programs on the financial performance
measures and the resulting likely impacts on investment
decisions, it is recoanended that an assessment be made
of the likelihood of investment decisions in terms of
financial performance measures. The result would be a
better appreciation of the likelihood that
connunications satellite business ventures will use the
results of the NASA technology prog rams and the results
that are necessary to achieve acceptance by the private
sector.
It is reconnended that the analysis be extended to the
area of mobile oonnunications satellite business
ventures. Since it may be more likely that mobile
comunications satellite business ventures will develop
than CBS business ventures, future analyses should
place more emphasis on mobile applications than on CBS
applications.
It is reccmnended that the COMSAT II Kxfel be modified
so as to include a set of cost estimating relationships
as an integral part of the Model. This will reduce the
complexities of the overall analysis of each technology
program and will allow mass and power (and other
attributes that nay be variables in the cost estimating
relationships) uncertainties to be considered and their
impacts determined. Inputs to the Model would then
include estimates of subsystem mass and power and their
uncertainties. Cost estimation would be performed by
the DOBSKT_II Model and not exogenously.
It is reconmended that the Model be modified so as to
include other transportation scenarios such as repair,
retrieval, and reusable upper stages. It is also
recconended that the Model be modified to explicitly
include the transportation scenarios that may result
from the use of the Space Station as a transportation
node. This will allow assessments to be made of the
value of these other transportation scenarios and
associated pricing policies on coonunicaticns satellite
business ventures.
It is reconmended that a number of minor modifications
be made to the DOMSAT II Model to eliminate
deficiencies that have been found during its use and
application to the FSS and DBS analyses.
1. INHCDOCTION
The justification of R&D programs that lead to spacecraft
technology improvements encompasses the establishment of the
benefits in terns of improved scientific knowledge that may
result frcn new and/or improved NASA science missions, improved
cost effectiveness of NASA and DGD missions and new or improved
services that nay be offered by the private sector (such as
coranunication satellite services). Cost effectiveness benefits
associated with government programs may be established in terms
of life cycle cost reductions in achieving a specified set of
mission requirements. [1-4] Benefits that may result from
government programs aimed at the development of technology that
might alter conaercial business venture investment decisions and
profit and cash flow patterns can only be evaluated by planning
and evaluating business ventures that might be impacted by the
technology developments. [5-7] Attention has focused on this
latter area.
Analyses have been performed that lead to the establishment
of the financial impact of spacecraft technology improvements on
private sector connunicaticns satellite business ventures. This
is accomplished by assessing the value of spacecraft technology
improvements in terms of the changes in cash flow, present value
of cash flows, and return on investment that may result from the
use of new and/or improved spacecraft technology for specific
types of private sector cccnunications satellite missions.
Attention has focused on business ventures providing fixed
satellite services (FSS) and direct broadcast services (DBS).
The establishment of the impacts on coonurdcations satellite
business ventures requires the formulation of typical
comunications satellite business ventures, the simulation
modeling of these ventures, the establishment of appropriate
business and technology data bases, and the analysis of the
business ventures with and without NASA investment in spacecraft
technology programs.
Typical FSS and DBS communications satellite business
ventures have been formulated based upon discussions with the
carriers, FOC filings and previous experience. The structuring
of the business ventures includes a determination of the services
to be provided (i.e., protected and non-protected transponders)
and the demand for these services, sparing arrangements, use of
insurance, number of satellites and their desired launch dates,
anticipated launch delays, etc. Specific data pertaining to
typical overhead rates, G&A rates, market forecasts, and other
factors have been obtained. Typical spacecraft have been
configured for use in the FSS and DBS business ventures. The
baseline spacecraft configurations are based upon a technology
base in the absence of NASA technology development programs.
Spacecraft are then reconfigured so as to encompass a technology
base with a specified (by NASA) set of NASA technology
development programs. The spacecraft configurations provide
inputs to the financial analysis such as subsystem reliability
and consequences of failures (i.e., graceful degradation), neuter
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of transponders, and recurring and non-recurring costs.
The spacecraft characteristics as determined by available
technology (i.e., with and without NASA programs) are provided as
input, together with business scenario data, to a financial
simulation model. It oust be emphasized that since ouch of the
data can best be characterized as uncertainty variables (that is,
specific single valued projections cannot be made with confidence
and the variables can best be described in terms of ranges of
uncertainty and the form of the uncertainty), the analysis
considers the uncertainty and risk dimensions. This is
particularly important since many technology development programs
are specifically aimed at influencing private sector investment
decisions through a reduction in perceived risk. [6]
A financial simulation model was developed [Reference 8
served as the basis for this work] that allows the financial
impact of S/C technology programs to be evaluated for a broad
range of point-to-point/point-to- multipoint (i.e., fixed
satellite services, FSS) and direct broadcast connunicaticn
satellite (DBS) business scenarios. The model allows a broad
range of connunications satellite business ventures to be
simulated explicitly and quantitatively taking into account
uncertainty, unreliability and resulting risk. The model
provides a means for evaluating the financial impacts of S/C
technology programs and orbital transfer programs on private
sector business ventures. This is accomplished by reconfiguring
S/C taking into account the anticipated results of the technology
programs. The resulting S/C configurations are ccnnunicated to
the financial aodel through specific estimates of cost,
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performance and reliability. These estimates are then ccnbined
with a business scenario (i.e., number of satellites as a
function of tine, number and type of transponders, demand for
transponders, ocnnunications services provided, launch system
scenario as a function of tine, likely launch tine delays,
transfer time from LEO to GED, cost of insurance, satellite
control operations expense, GlA expense, etc.) to establish
annual profit (loss), annual cash flow, emulative cash flow,
BOA, payback period, and ROI. The financial performance measures
are all described by probability distributions (i.e., risk
profiles) since demand, price and cost uncertainties (i.e.,
uncertainty profiles) and subsystem reliability are considered.
The impact of the technology programs are assessed in terms
of the differences that result in financial performance measures
which are the result of differences in S/C performance and cost
attributes resulting from the technology programs. Two analyses
are necessary for assessing the financial impacts of the S/C
technology programs on a connunicaticns satellite business
venture; one analysis based upon a satellite configured in the
absence of the technology program (i.e., the base case), and a
second analysis based upon a satellite configuration
incorporating the assumed results of the technology program. The
difference in the financial results is therefore assumed to be
directly attributable to the technology program.
Analyses have been performed and results obtained for on-
board propulsion (ion-thrusters) and power system (solar cells)
technology programs as specified by TO5A. Satellites have been
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configured and costed both with and without the technology
programs. Differences in both performance and cost attributes
have been taken into account in the financial analysis. Results
are presented in the following pages that indicate the likely
financial impacts of these technology programs on typical PSS and
DBS business ventures utilizing spin and three-axis stabilized
spacecraft.
The financial simulation model, DCHSAT II, is a stochastic
(Monte Carlo) simulation model that represents a broad range of
fixed satellite and direct broadcast service communications
satellite business ventures. The Model is specifically
configured to assess the impacts of the S/C technology and
related programs upon the financial performance of PSS and DBS
business ventures. The COMSAT II Model is implemented on an IBM-
PC (see Appendix A for the Model description, and Appendix B for
the Model user and programmer documentation) with input data
provided using LOTOS 123. The LOTOS data file is then read by
the Model which is written in FORTRAN.
The analysis of a spacecraft technology program consists of
establishing a baseline connunicatibns satellite business venture
scenario in terms of a baseline spacecraft configuration. The
spacecraft cost and performance attributes are specified to the
DOMSAT II Model along with the specification of the business
scenario. The Model then establishes the financial performance
measures of the business as a function of time. The effects of
S/C technology programs are assessed by specifying the
anticipated results of the technology program, reconfiguring the
spacecraft utilizing the assumed new level of technology, costing
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the spacecraft and specifying the cost _and performancei attributes^
to the DGMSAT II Model. New financial performance Measures are
thence developed utilizing the new spacecraft in the specified
business scenario.
The resulting financial information will provide insight
into the financial implications of NASA technology programs on
typical FSS and DBS coBOunications satellite business ventures.
The financial information includes both expected values and
standard deviations so that the effects of the government
programs can be observed in the form of both changes in expected
values and changes in risk levels. Both of these dimensions are
important since investment decisions take into account both the
expected and risk dimensions.
This report describes the methodology developed for
evaluating NASA spacecraft and related programs in terms of their
impacts on communications <satellite business ventures and
presents results of the analyses performed on two spacecraft
technology programs (ion-thrusters for en-orbit propulsion and
improved solar cells). The methodology is described in Section 2
with details presented in the appendicies. The general
description of business scenarios is discussed in Section 3.
U.S. and foreign S/C technologies (ion-thrusters and solar cells)
are described in Section 4. The S/C configurations for both the
FSS and IBS missions with and without the technology programs
are described in Section 5. The business ventures are described
and results of the financial analyses of the technology programs
on the PSS and DBS business ventures are summarized in Section 6.
The indications of the technology programs on spacecraft markets
is discussed in Section 7, both frcn the points of view of the
specific scenarios considered and the ccnnunicaticns satellite
industry. Other applications of the methodology are discussed in
Section 8.
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2. METHODOLOGY
2.1 Tn*"rftAv7tifT
The objective of the reported effort was to develop an
economic evaluation and planning capability appropriate for the
evaluation of spacecraft (S/C) technologies such as space power
and on-orbit propulsion systems, to perform technology
assessments and projections and to then, using the developed
capability, assess the impact of NASA and foreign technology
programs on typical fixed satellite service (FSS) and direct
broadcast service (DBS) comunications satellite business
ventures. An additional objective was to perform the analysis of
the impacts of the spacecraft technology programs in ouch the
same way as might be performed by commercial ventures so as to
provide credible results for assessment by the private sector.
Figure 2.1 presents an overview of the methodology for assessing
the impacts of NASA S/C technology programs on coonunicaticns
satellite business ventures.
Using typical FSS and DBS missions, general business
scenarios were developed that served as the basis for the
simulation modeling and the basis for assessing the impact of
NASA S/C technology programs. The business scenario information
included sparing concepts, demand characteristics (for example,
protected and preemptible transponders), insurance concepts,
financial treatment of failures, failure/recovery concepts, as
well as other factors that influenced the structure and
configuration of the DOHSAT II financial simulation model. The
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business scenario information also included quantitative data
such as typical levels of general and administrative (G&A)
expanse,' R&D expense and other parameters that are necessary to
characterize typical business ventures. The business scenario
information was obtained from the published literature, including
FCC filings, as well as direct discussions with the carriers.
Typical sets of performance characteristics were established
for the FSS and DBS coonunications missions. These performance
characteristics, based upon mission requirements (i.e., channel
capacity, reliability, etc.), served as the initial basis for
establishing spacecraft configurations. Tables 2.1 and 2.2
summarize satellite performance characteristics (as well as other
factors). Based upon these data, the availability of detailed
design data, and the desire to consider both spin- and three-axis
stabilized configurations in combination with both low and high
power configurations, it was decided to consider a spin
stabilized low power S/C configuration as the basis for the PSS
business venture. It was also decided to consider a three-axis
stabilized high power S/C configuration as the basis for the DBS
business venture. As will be described in following paragraphs,
both of these configurations were modified to take advantage of
on-orbit propulsion and improved solar cell capabilities assumed
to result from NASA specified technology programs. The
spacecraft performance characteristics were thus established for
both the DBS and FSS ooonunicaticns satellite missions in the
1990 time frame.
The performance characteristics included radiated power,
17
QRI08NAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
I!
siIs!
I
111
!&.
in
if!
fi
18
8ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUAtrfY
U I
3
«-4
a
222
8 . S S 222
I M
iii
8
o>
Si
hii
s s s s s
il
b b te too o •
««b b bO Oirt >n ~ --
!•' </*„.;.:• ,';,,:, ;
n«< r>t
r» S 7 X XX
• W1 £
-<
tt
-
1
a
i!
12
5i
i
s
••«
•**
3
£££££
b b b b bO O O O O
a a a a a
s §§§§iiiiii llii
O ^ ^ A ^ ^ 4 O O O O2 « «« «
•35S5S5 e
a
»»fi-»«
is:s> »><
II
U «4«4*4 C C C C C C C
a a
OO OOO O O O < •ooooo oo r-r^r-r-
52 ou u wo'
eoo oo
U (J U U U
OO
« ?i
555
> « m < e r > 0 > « ms sisss & •BCD§$s
-ii
| !I *
I
i
-i y w w
ii III
i- i - I i ?l II£ I « * 1 « !b ij
„„_„{,_„ __ 6 T ? s
2^^«4«<-^*««««4 W W • • • • • • • < H *O > 9C> 9 b. w C ^^^^^^^^^^ 9
tiiiitil 88 5586855 SS5 t £££ a333<S34 7
19
I I
i
-fl-f\—«•» ftI -.-"**
-m « « i* m'
I
8 if
L
i
S1
•
3
>^ii
£*
X X
S S
s
SRSS
8
8
3
|
8
I*
ri
s&
!""in rfi v^
13111
X X Z Z Z
ii sista to wiii
^J ^  •* p^ *^ **
* * • U* L* C* O
_%--*._%-- _
s3«Ss «•s •»
ilifflS
**
OOO —-.-I*"^  ^  r* 1*1 m *n
OOOXSX
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OR POOR QUALITY
III
SSS
V « <B
o o o
<o » «
III ???
Ill 333
XXX ZZ Z
sss ___
« « « «
I
"2 -2 "2
£ £ £
:o
i. 2S
* MiI a {5 5
5«S2
e
r«
8888
*« «M *« »4
8888
0
ifl!
£
s
i 8 3 3 8
r^ •
i s !
|3
£
S3
000 O
il
IfiiiiiL.Jff M
2222 2
s' 8 8 8 8 8
333
-
99989398839398
e c e
o o o o o oe oo o o oo o ooo r-r-r-r> o o o o o
3. 3. 3. u u o u u 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1
I\
I
3
«4
3
3
«
i I
w
8
ta
32
• • 9
J ^ -^
8 8
— —
H ||
II
>.-" r«
x * r
21
PAGE ls
i-
i
« • «<nl i t -
a
B
lt 
30
,
 
i
m
ra
ra
a
tt
oa
a 
or
 
o
an
ap
on
d*
a
n
a
Bl
t
I
an
oa
a
tra
na
lta
/a
t * a
iph
on
*
oo
nf
 
a
, 
ea
ch
?li«*
w
li
if
I
""
*
s
"
. _ . €8 -ssfc
3S3S . -St ...
435 f* SS8S
£2222222 222
§BBIB§868868§68l94 ^ 4 ^ 4 V « ^ ^ > 4 J 4 J - * < ' 4 V - U 4 ^ 4 W M 4 ^ a ^ ^ ' 4 M > iillllli
22
II5 2££
1 .. R22
sf! a**
*!* S*5
sis
3
ORIGINAL PAGE 13
OF POOR QUALITY
5 5 S 5
^ ** <U «M
f- r* r* r- i£$£
mm wi if>
S S S 5
? !
C <c 5 G
«» —— — J I/I W1
II
£
I
§..
?? 8888i <e « »n <^
^«< ^ * ^ * ^ ^ A
SSS5
aaaa
c c e c u w u u c c c
•2T5-S-2 O O O O rf-a-a
a a s a
f!
8,
f
«
»•<
O O O O O O O 9 > 9 > O O O O O O O O r-i l O O O O O O O O O O O O O
sssl = = 1!u u u u 2555 o w u w < j u u o o o < j u w u o 5 5 5 5 5 5 i j
5«2
•M e «< i te ie <e <o
rs M <N (N IM (S (N M (N 04
wr-(D0iIsss
1
?
* I
!
3i -'
^ i
•^ f
•-» 1
ii
1 I 3 §*L si r «I Efif *i C H « • • -<
i O fc3 fc.
3333 j; iiiiiiiiifiiiiiiiiiif fi
23
« *•» « *n
---»•-£ sssg • •
8
- 0>-~
!S-J
•° - * i
P£ *1
'3 22*5
888S
« « « «
I*J5
fljflo
M
r»r?«
sltn
?s i s
,iI I I I rir*r<
3333 333
zzzz zzzz zzz
*** **ft:•:. ?!?.
« O 1-1 « —
ooeoSS
• ••• fabbd 5*>**3333**333353*'*'555*'*'im mi iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii!
I* II iiii ill iii | i» 1I5§ ;:§ BiI 9*** ! 9999 O^r- o 3335 ill I
8
oooe
|£ j 0 0 0 0 na8 iiii
fcs
i ££££
••'••• 5-2
*** itS k< u aO O « K
•J*i •« • •
W * W D
« til
l £ 5 ! ££££ £BB 8
•? l*> i ~" "
5
AJ
*4
i
6..S
S ta W bO O O
c c c e
****
i e
aaa
1222 •««««• IS IN C N I N I N I N
LZ1 i- immn SISS
k. «-• «N (^  2
*
r* r^ f** f^
aaa a ORIGINAL PAGE IS
SSS
i Ofl
sss
pt m m ^  9 O
SSSS 8.
MMMM |f
a a a a
 i n
o o o
1514 555
M I N I N I N I N < N I N IN
POOR QUALmf
» ^
e-s
I If -1 •"'
-j 9,
5 Ea I
25
i 2
i »• i
i P-*«&
eeeo «N
v « « « v
R X >4 -4 eT« v « 9 •n t* n t*i *Mn*ir> <e <e <e
I
8SSS
S
o « « o
w » » *»
i
s
SS8 S ssssw Ptr* ««
4 Iit 3~~~
IT
I
iH
8
111!
8888
to to to X
SSS r« ill!
ill
I?
a I*
ssssI I i i r> r- r- r-
*^ in *> n
SSSS
S b w too o o
3SS3 HI2222
M n_ ^ o o o 01
«"*!
s s
I "% i
' to to
^* & O
to ^4
1 1 !
= fi s i;
a*
*S* f I! l!?!
*> * > I c9 °" So —
26
w~
frequency, number of beams, beam-width, pointability, stability,
life characteristics, number of transponders, as well as other
factors.
A financial simulation model was developed and used to
assess the impact of the spacecraft technology programs on the
typical FSS and DBS business ventures. The model is stochastic
(Monte Carlo) and based upon the COMSAT Model principals. [48,49]
The model explicitly allows for the consideration of pertinent
subsystem performance characteristics including reliabilities and
various cost, expense, capital expenditure and timing
uncertainties. The result is the determination of a range of
financial performance measures including quantitative measures of
risk. This allows both the expected value and risk dimensions to
be taken into account in the assessment of the value of the
introduction of new technologies.
Typical FSS and DBS business venture scenarios were
developed and analyzed based upon base case satellites — a spin-
stabilized configuration for the FSS system and a three-axis
configuration for the DBS system (these are described in detail
in Section 4). NASA specified the likely outcomes of an ion-
thruster technology program and a Gallium Arsenide solar array
program. These new technology capabilities were then considered
and the two base case satellites reconfigured to make best use of
the attributes of the technologies. The satellites were
reconfigured to maximize the financial performance of the
business ventures and not to minimize the cost of the satellites.
It nust be emphasized that one technology was not simply
substituted for another technology but the satellite was
27
reconfigured (and recosted) so as to fully take advantage of the
attributes of the new technologies.
Both nonrecurring and unit recurring costs were estimated
for each satellite configuration (including the base cases). The
RCA PRICE cost estimating model was used for this purpose.
Changes in reliability were also estimated as well as other
spacecraft attributes. These factors were then used in the same
business scenarios as evaluated with the base case satellites to
establish the resulting changes in the business ventures
financial performance measures. The changes in the financial
performance measures were therefore assumed to result from the
technology programs.
The financial performance measures resulting from use of the
new technology satellites were evaluated and the likely impacts
on investment decisions established. Foreign spacecraft
technology programs (on-orbit propulsion and solar cell) were
reviewed and assessments made, taking into account the financial
implications of the analyzed technology programs, of the likely
impact of these programs with and without the NASA technology
programs on U.S. imports and exports. It must be emphasized that
even though these assessments were based upon a very limited
assessment of business scenarios, a number of conclusions may be
drawn.
Discussions with the carriers and review of the FCC filings
indicated the need to consider the provision of multiple
communications services. Typical levels of service are indicated
in Table 2.3 and current pricing policies for these services are
28
TABLE 2.3 LEVELS OF PROTBCTICti OFFERED BY DIFFERENT CARRIERS
ATiT GTE RCA ASC WO
HAriMiUM PROTECTED PROTECTED PROTECTED PROTECTED
GOD PROTECTED/
PREEMPTIBLE
UNPROTECTED UNPROTECTED/ UNPROTECTED
NONPREEMPTIBLE
BRCNZE PREEMPTIBLE UNPROTECTED/ PREEMPTIBLE
PREEMPTIBLE
NOTE: THE RONS INDICATE EQUIVALENT LEVELS OF SERVICE
sunmarized in Table 2.4. The DOMSAT II Model therefore considers
the following four levels of service and allows a pricing policy
to be specified for each:
* Protected Service - protection is provided through
provisions of spares and preemptible transponders.
* Protected /Preemptible Service - protection is provided
through available spares and preenbtible transponders.
This service may be preempted if protected users require
transponders.
* Dnprotected/Non-Pre*3in'*' ibl e Service - a replacement
transponder is not guaranteed but service may not be
interrupted to provide service to other users.
* Preemptible - Protection is not provided and transponder
may be preempted if the transponder is required by a
protected user.
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TABLE 2.4 ANNUAL TRANSPONDER LEASE RATES IN THOUSAND OF DOLLARS
SERVICE AT&T
36MHz
PHUTBdiD 1,800
PROTECTED/ 1,500
PREEMPTIBLE
UNPROTECTED/
NONPREEMPTIBLE
PREEMPTIBLE 900
GTE1
1,320*
1,800
2,100
1,260
1,470
1,344
1,575
720
1,050
RCA2 ASC
1,350 1,920
1,650 1,950
1,800
950
1,225
1,300
515
800
750
WO3
2,070
2,760
1,152
1,794
910
1,380
72MB2 C-BAND KU-BAND
Ffri/mJitb
UNPROTECTED/
NONPREEMPTIBLE
PRCTECIED/
PREEMPTIBLE
PREEMPTIBLE
3,120
3,840
2,340
2,880
2,184
2,688
1,560
1,920
2,640
4,200
1,980
3,150
1,848
2,946
1,320
2,100
1 RATE VARIES FRCH ORIGINAL SERVICE (18 MONTHS) -HIGHER RATE-TO
EXTENDED SERVICE (36 MONTHS) -LOWER RATE.
2 THE FIRST RATE HAS CHARGED IN 1981 THE SECOND IN 1984.
3 LOWER RATE IS MCKTB TO MONTH, HIGHER IS FIXED TERM SERVICE.
4 SEVEN YEAR SERVICE IS LOWEST RATE.
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2.2 Review Of Pi
Investment in ocomunicaticns satellite business ventures
requires large up-front investment with significant returns
likely to be forthcoming typically five or more years after
initial investments. Ihe commitment of signif icant resources for
returns that nay occur in the distant future requires careful
planning and substantial analysis.
In general, the financial planning is concerned with the
development of financial performance measure such as after-tax
profit, cash flow, return on assets, return on sales, return on
investment (discounted), payback period, net present value and
quantitative measures of risk. 148, 50] A number of these measures
are defined in Figures 2.2 and 2.3.
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After-tax profit is the difference between revenues and
expenses, carry-forward losses and tax credits. . Depreciation is.
an allowed expense which accounts for the wearing out of capital
assets. Cash flow indicates the flow of funds through the
business venture including after-tax profit, depreciation,
capital expenditures and the change in balance sheet items such
as accounts receivable and inventory. Indebtedness is the
negative of the cumulative cash flow to any point in time. When
indebtedness is positive, cash outflows have exceeded cash
inflows. The peak of the indebtedness curve indicates the
maximum funding requirement of the business venture. The point
in time at which the indebtedness passes through zero is the
payback period and indicates the time it takes to recoup the
investment.
Return on assets is the after-tax profit divided by the book
value of total assets. Book value is the value of the original
capital expenditures less accumulated depreciation. Assets
include capital items as well as cash, receivables and inventory.
Return on sales is the after-tax profit divided by the annual
revenue.
The net present value (NEV) is the summation of the stream
of cash flows discounted to the present where the discount rate
is the cost of capital (some firms utilize a risk adjusted rate
of return or hurdle rate). The discounted return on investment,
ROI, or the internal rate of return, is the value of the discount
rate that yields a present value of zero. In other words, the
ROI is the rate of return at which the time adjusted value of
cash outflows is equal to the time adjusted value of cash
32
NET PRESENT
VALUE,$
HURDLE RATE
INTERNAL RATE
OF RETURN
NET PRESENT VALUE
DISCOUNT RATE,%
CASE PLOW(T)
DISCOUNT RATE)'
INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN = DISCOUNT RATE SUCH THAT
PRESENT VALUE - 0.
FIGURE 2.3 DEFINITION OF NET PRESENT VALUE AH) INTERNAL
RATE OF RETURN
1.0
PROBABILITY
THAT ROI
EXCEEDS
INDICATED
VALUES
COST OF CAPITAL
SCENARIO B
SCENARIO A
ROI
FIGURE 2.4 RISK PROFILES OF ROI
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inflows. If the HOI exceeds the cost of capital or hurdle rate
then it is desirable to persue the business venture.
There exist many areas of uncertainty; performance, cost,
market and schedule. These combined with reliability
considerations (both satellite and transportation system) result
in risk where risk is defined as the perceived variability
associated with the financial performance measures. A convenient
way of illustrating risk is in the form of "risk profiles",
[48,50] as illustrated in Figure 2.4. The risk profiles
indicate the chance that a performance measure such as ROI will
exceed different values. It is the function of the DOKSAT II
Model (Section 2.3) to convert the various quantitative
uncertainty estimates and the effects of unreliability (in the
form of random and wearout failures) into the risk profiles
associated with the business venture. [48-50] It is through the
quantitative consideration of uncertainty, unreliability and
resulting risk that differences can be observed between the use
of satellites based upon current technology and those satellites
configured as a result of NASA spacecraft technology programs.
Figure 2.5 illustrates risk profiles of present value of
cash flow for the same business scenario (with unreliability
considered but with all uncertainties set to zero - i.e., the
certainty scenario) but with en-orbit propulsion system life of 8
and 12 years. Increasing the life front 8 to 12 years (all other
factors remaining constant) increases the expected (because the
risk profiles are synnetric normal distributions, the 50 percent
and expected values are the same) net present value of the
34
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FIGURE 2.5 PRESENT VALUE RISK PROFILES OF A TYPICAL FSS
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GN-CRBIT PROPULSION SYSTEM LIFE INCREASED
FROH 8 TO 12 YEARS (CERTAINTY SCENARIO)
business venture by $27 million. If this were the only business
venture to utilize the improved on-orbit propulsion system then
(expected) expenditures of less than $27 million to create the
technology would be reasonable. These risk profiles are combined
and replotted in Figure 2.6 indicating the chance that the
incremental net present value will exceed different levels or the
value of the new technology to the business venture will exceed
different levels.
Generally, many alternatives can be identified (this will be
elaborated upon in following paragraphs) front the application of
the same and different technologies and must be compared for the
selection of the best one. The problems of comparison are eased
sonewhat by the fact that the probability distributions of the
35
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present value of cash flows, return on investment, KOI, and other
financial performance measures, are usually very near normal.
Thus, the distributions can be fully characterized by their mean,
n, and standard deviation, a , and each alternative can be
represented by the point on the m-a plane. An example is
illustrated in Figure 2.7 (in terms of BOD. Here, alternatives
1 and 3 have the same level of risk (i.e., <r 1 equals a 3) but the
expected ROI of alternative 1 is greater than that of alternative
3. Therefore, alternative 1 is preferable to alternative 3. In
a similar manner it can be argued that alternative 2 is
preferable to alternative 4. Also in a similar manner,
alternative 1 is preferable to alternative 2 since both have the
1
same expected ROI but alternative 2 is riskier. This process can
be continued with all alternatives being considered. In the
limit it can be seen that a frontier of "best" alternatives can
be established. Bach of the points, or alternatives, represented
by the frontier are different in the respect that the risk and
the expected ROI are different. The selection of the specific
best alternative depends upon the decision maker's risk
judgement. That is, the decision maker must decide what the
tradeoff is between an increase in expected BOI and an
accompanying increase in risk. fypothetical tradeoffs in the
form of a preference function (that is, all points on the
preference function are of equal value to the decision maker)
indicated by the dashed line in Figure 2.7. The point of
tangency of this function with the frontier of best alternatives
provides the alternative with the maximum value to the decision
maker.
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As will be seen, the selection of the best alternative is
important in evaluating and comparing the impact of alternative
spacecraft technology programs. The considered NASA technology
programs (i.e., ion-thrusters and Gallium Arsenide solar cells)
have the ability of reducing overall spacecraft mass without
altering the performance attributes of the spacecraft. Ibe mass
reduction can be taken with the result that transportation
charges may be reduced leading to an increase in expected RDI
(through cost reduction) with little or no change in risk. On
the otherhand, the mass may be put back in a nunber of different
ways, each of which alters spacecraft attributes such as en-orbit
propulsion system life, number of active transponders, number of
spare transponders, etc. This is illustrated hypothetically in
Figure 2.8 where the possible alternative spacecraft
configurations (i.e., use of mass savings resulting from the
introduction of the new technology) are indicated by points in
the m- a plot of the resulting ROI of the communications satellite
business venture. For example, a considerable increase in
expected RDI, with an accompanying increase in risk, nay result
from introducing an ion propulsion system with sufficient
propellant to extend satellite wearout life but with a perceived
reduction in mean-time-to-failure. Note that changes are all
relative to the base case, which is the business venture
performance (m and *) in the absence of the technology programs.
The best use of the mass requires the establishment of the
preference curve or risk aversion attitudes as described in
Figure 2.7. With the risk aversion attitudes indicated by the
38
dashed lines in Figure 2.8, alternative D offers the best use of
the mass savings and therefore represents the •"«»<"•"» value of
the technology program when the results of the program are used
in the postulated business scenario. When alternative technology
programs are to be compared, the comparison must use the maximum
values of each of the technologies as illustrated in Figure 2.9.
Bere T2 represents case D in Figure 2.8. From Figure 2.9, the
choice is between technology 1 (Tl) and 2 (T2) both of which
offer approximately the same value. It should be noted that both
the expected BDI and risk of technology 1 exceed those of
technology 2.
2.3 Overview fl£ the DQMSAT H Itodel
Based upon discussions with the carriers, a stochastic
financial simulation model was developed by Princeton
Synergetics, Inc. for NASA's LeRC. The DOMSAT II Model allows
the impact of S/C technology programs to be evaluated for a broad
range of camunications satellite business ventures providing a
multiplicity of ccnmunications services. The Model allows the
results of the technology programs to be evaluated in terms of
their impact on the financial performance of typical
canDunications satellite business ventures.
The DOMSKT n Model is currently operational on the IBM PC
with the input data provided via a user friendly LOTOS 123
system. Bie mathematical computations are performed in FORTRAN.
The Model has been used to assess the impact of LeftC on-orbit
propulsion and spacecraft power technology programs on both PSS
and DBS business ventures using both spin and three-axis
EIPECTED
KOI
DISK AVEHSION
ATTITUDES
At DOPSEP MPUOff UfE OT ON-gCIT
HOHLSXGM stsm t HII.UD MBF
•( NEOLCEO TKANS. COST
Cl ADD. SPARE TRONSPONOCHS
Di ADO. ACTIVE TMANSPONOCMS
(OCMANO > OAieiNOL SUPPLY)
Cl ADO. ACTIVE THANSPONDCRS
(DEMM4O 4 ONIBINAL SUPPLY)
STA»OMMD DEVIATION Of AOI (RISK)
FIGURE 2.8 ASSESSMENT OF THE BEST DSE OF MASS SAVINGS FOR
A PARTICULAR TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM
EXPECTED
KOI
BASECASE
•TflMIMD DEVIATION Of MOI <"I8K)
FIGURE 2.9 COMPARISON OF TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS
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stabilized spacecraft. The Model is described in detail in
Appendix A with user and programmer documentation provided in
Appendix B.
The methodology developed allows a broad range of fixed
satellite services and direct broadcast ccnnunication satellite
business scenarios to be analyzed through the use of the DOHSAT
II financial simulation model. The Model allows a broad range of
coomjnicaticns satellite business ventures to be simulated
explicitly and quantitatively taking into account uncertainty,
unreliability and resulting risk. The objective is to assess the
impact of NASA spacecraft technology programs (for example, on-
orbit propulsion and power programs) upon commercial
ccnmunications satellite business ventures by planning typical
business ventures utilizing satellites without and with the
technology being considered for development. The value of the
technology program is then related to the changes in financial or
economic performance measures which then provides insights into
the likelihood that the technology will be utilized by the
business ventures.
The Model provides the means for evaluating the financial
impacts of S/C technology programs, space transportation programs
and related policies, on private sector communications satellite
business ventures. It specifically allows for the consideration
of hybrid (i.e., C- and Ku-band) satellite configurations. This
is accomplished by reconfiguring S/C taking into account the
anticipated results of S/C technology programs. The resulting
S/C configurations are connunicated to the DCHSAT II Model
through specific estimates of cost, performance and reliability.
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These.estimates are then combinedI with a business scenario (i.e.,
number of satellites as a function of tine, number and type of
transponders, demand for transponders by type of service
provided, pricing, price elasticity, launch system scenario as a
function of time, likely launch time delays, transfer time from
LEO to GBO, cost of insurance, satellite control operations
expense, GtA expense, etc.) to establish annual profit (loss),
annual cash flow, emulative cash flow, BOA, payback period, and
BOI. The financial performance measures are all described by
probability distributions (i.e., risk profiles) since cost
uncertainties (i.e., uncertainty profiles) and subsystem
reliability are considered.
The impact of S/C technology programs can be assessed in
terms of the differences that result in financial performance
measures which are the result of differences in S/C performance
and cost attributes resulting from the S/C technology programs
and new services made possible by the technology programs. Two
analyses are necessary for assessing the financial impacts: one
analysis based upon a satellite configuration in the absence of
the S/C technology program (i.e., the base case), and a second
analysis based upon a satellite configuration incorporating the
assumed results of the S/C technology program. The difference in
the financial results is therefore assumed to be directly
attributable to the C/C technology program.
The establishment of a business scenario consists of speci-
fying the following information (a typical data base used in the
analysis of a PSS business venture is presented in appendix B):
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* ranter of years in the business plan
* maximm number of operational satellites
* desired launch schedule
* possible launch delays
* time to transfer frent LEO to GEO
* nunter of narrow-band transponder groups/satellite
* nunber of wide-band transponder groups/satellite
* number of transponders per narrow-band group
* ntnber of transponders per wide-band group
* nunber of spare transponders per narrow-band group
* number of spare transponders per wide-band group
* transponder reliability characteristics (mean tine to
failure, expected wearout life, variability of wearout
life)
* S/C support subsystem (up to 5) reliability characteristics
* types of comunications services provided (protected, pro-
tected/preemptible, unprotected, and preemptible)
* tariffs per narrow and wide-band transponders for each
type of comnunications service
* annual denand for narrow- and wide-band transponders in
terns of type of service
* relaunch threshold in terns of number of operational
transponders
* annual cost of S/C operations
* annual GfcA expense (fixed and variable)
* annual R&D expense (fixed and variable)
* other annual expenses (fixed and variable)
* insurance cost
* S/C cost spreading
* S/C unit recurring cost
43
S/C nonrecurring cost
* S/C unit recurring cost learning rate
* launch ooet
* launch scenario as a function of tine (described in terms
of the probability of success of each of the najor steps
in the launch sequence)
* depreciation lives
* interest rates
* tax related data
* discount rates
* balance sheet related data.
Many of the above variables are considered as uncertainty
variables requiring the specification of the range of uncertainty
and the form of the uncertainty.
Ibe Model allows uncertainty and unreliability to be
considered explititly and quantitatively. This is absolutely
necessary when comparing programs which are specifically aimed at
reducing uncertainty and altering reliability both of which
i
effect perceived risk and hence effect investment decisions. Ho
establish the quantitative measures of risk, the Model utilizes
Monte Carlo techniques wherein the complete business scenario is
repeated a large nutnber of times (typically 1000 or more) each
time randomly sampling from the uncertainty profiles and the
reliability characteristics which are specified. The results of
all the business analyses are saved and appropriate statistics
developed. Financial performance measures are summarized in
terms of expected values and standard deviations. Typical
financial reports are illustrated in Figures 2.10 and 2.11 with
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c.
o.
6033.
96851.
8386.*
1361*6.
0.
0.
4035.
14O181.
13416.*
138503.
O.
O.
££31.
14073*.
12533. •
131022.
0.
O.
3330.
13437£.
12664.*
LAUNCH OPERATIONS
LAUNCH INSURANCE
SATELLITE
OTHER
DEPRECIATION EXPENSE
S/C CONTROL OPERATIONS
ENGINEERING EXPENSE
RESEARCH * DEVELOPMENT
OTAL OPERATIONS EXPENSE
4373.
1759.
7315.
i*ea.
14936.
15O9.
1777.
1777.
20001.
1617. •
6343.
3467.
1OO44.
1649.
£0503.
1977.
1977.
1977.
£643*.
2968.*
6619.
3633.
1O674.
1649.
21774.
2523.
3804.
2604.
29905.
29*7. «
7050.
10971.
1649.
22381.
2533.
2815.
2815.
30544.
36OO.•
2805.
11314.
1643.
23094.
2553.
2687.
2687.
4504.*
ROSS <•) 68781.
9903. •
72421.
8871.•
110677.
13836.*
11O191.
143O4.•
103350.
15346.*
S/C NONRECURRING COST
5 * A EXPENSE
DEBT SERVICE EXPENSE
O.
1210.
215£9.
0.
1291.
20471.
O.
1341.
17079.
O.
1344.
9294.
O.
1441.
-£15.
BEFORE TAX PROFIT
INCOflE TAX
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT
AC-TEA TAX PROFIT
46041.
16575.
1299.
3O766.
5926.•
50660.
18238.
5538.
38021.
6161.*
91857.
33O66.
1272.
60060.
9336.*
99552.
35839.
607.
64320.
11157.•
102124.
36,765.
713.
6607e.
12725. •
RETURN ON ASSETS 15.
3. •
IB.
4. «
30.
6.*
35.
8. «
4O.
11. «
RETURN ON SALES 34.
6.*
38.
4.*
43.
5.*
45.
6.* 7. •
• STANDARD DEVIATION
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COSH CLOW PROJECTION (• THOUSANDS)
YEAR
AFTER TAX PROFIT
INCREASE IN PAYABLES
DECREASE IN RECEIVABLES
DECREASE IN CASH
DEPRECIATION
TQTAC CASH INFLOW
1
O.
1596.
O.
0.
O.
1598.
0.
1*89.
0.
Ic.
*16.
1916.
O.
3203.
O.
O.
ISS9.
**3£.
O.
388.
O.
as.
7506.
77; 6.
78.
13669.
385£5.
LOSS
DECREASE IN PAYABLES
INCREASE IN RECEIVABLES
INCREASE IN CASH
COP IT Be EXPENDITURES
TOTAL CASH OUTFLOW
O.
O.
£69.
O.
:£6ia.
506*.
64.
C>.
£69.
261*6.
335**.
O.
O.
579.
67337.
7£«,J.
;26.
1677.
7O.
6O793.
6S392.
1O1.
1169.
9436.
14.
36566.
*9390.
NET CASH FLOW -11O1*.
-31626.
6c*3. •
-5767*.
9906.*
-:0865.
INDEBTEDNESS 1101*.
625S.•
11O67&. 1665*5.
15*66.«
179A11.
15185.4
DISCOUNT RATE <»)
1 2 3 * 5
10. 15. 80. £5. *0.
N£f PRESENT VALUE "A"
NET PRESENT VALUE "f"
B&51O. ilO5*.
6313£.
-13601.
23965.
-*eoot.
9977. 1017.
NE' PRESENT VALUE £79361.
630S2.•
6*166.
**3O*.«
1O16*.
276*9.*
-22078.
16769.• 7874.»
• STANDARD D E V I O T T Q N
FIGUPE 2.11 FSS CASH FlflW PRCJBCTION
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detailed launch—and S/C -purchase^  ^sUtijtUcs^ Ulustrated in
Figures 2.12 and 2.13. It should be noted that the financial
documents contain expected values except for those items which
are noted with * indicating standard deviations. The particular
form of the financial statements is the result of discussions
with several carriers.
The Model develops nany financial performance measures
including after-tax profit, annual cash flow, cumulative cash
flow, return on sales, return on assets, payback period, and net
present value. Expected values and standard deviations are
established for all of these. The net present value is
established at a number of discount rates so that the internal
rate, of return (or discounted return on investment - PDI) can
easily be established.
The Model consists basically of two parts. The first,
utilizing the desired schedule of events, demand for
comnunications services, the satellite configuration, specified
launch scenario and reliability characteristics, establishes the
specific timing and number of events and their costs. The
availability of transponders (taking into account failures,
sparing concepts and services offered) is matched against launch
decision criteria in order to establish the schedule for
replacement launches and the timing of additional capital
expenditures for replacement satellites and launches. The timing
and cost information is then passed to the second part of the
Model which performs the financial computations and establishes
values of the financial performance measures.
The Model is implemented such that certainty conditions can
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be easily analyzed as well as the uncertainty situations. For
example, the number of desired runs is an input parameter and can
be set to one when all ranges of uncertainty are set to zero
(i.e., minimum and maximum values are set equal). A user
friendly system has been developed for entering this data into
the Model and is described in Appendix B.
2.4 Cost Eirt-itnatifin - The RCA PRICE Model
The analysis of cconunications satellite business ventures
requires the specification of satellite recurring and
nonrecurring costs. The RCA PRICE Model, a set of cost
estimating relationships and associated data base, was used to
establish the recurring and nonrecurring costs for the FSS and
DBS base case satellites as well as comparable costs for the
spacecraft utilizing the ion-thruster and Gallium Arsenide solar
cells as per the NASA specified technology programs. These "new"
technology configurations included major redesigns so as to make
most efficient use of the technology improvements.
The RCA PRICE Model was used for all cost estimates with the
exception of the launch costs. These were established using the
Space Shuttle pricing formula that relates price to mass or
length. The cost estimation is described in Section 5.4.
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3. BUSINESS SCENARIOS
The DGMSAT II Model was configured so as to simulate a broad
range of OGonunications satellite business ventures. As with all
models that attempt to simulate the real world there are
limitations to the scope of the business ventures that nay be
reasonably simulated. Even for those that may be simulated the
level of detail considered is limited. The following paragraphs
indicate the range of business scenarios that Bay be simulated
and describe in general terms the business scenarios considered
for assessing the impact of the specified NASA technology
programs. Ibe specifics of the considered scenarios are
described in Section 6 and Appendix C.
Business scenarios are described in terms of market,
technology, financial and scheduling considerations. In general,
the market considerations include the specification of the
services to be provided, the demand for the services, pricing of
services and price elasticities (cross-elasticities are not
considered). The technology considerations include the
specification of the number and type of transponders and their
arrangement (including sparing), and transponder and other S/C
subsystem reliability characteristics. Technology considerations
also include the specification of the launch scenario in terms of
the probability of success of performing each of the major steps
in the launch sequence. Scheduling considerations include
desired launch times for initial launches and likely rescheduling
launch delays. The financial considerations include the
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specification of launch, insurance, S/C nonrecurring and
recurring costs and associated cost spreading functions. It also
includes the specification of tax related data, interest rates,
discount rates and various expense and balance sheet data. The
data requirements are summarized in Section 2 and described in
detail in Appendix B.
The establishment of a business scenario starts by
specifying the maximum number of operational satellites that will
be included in the business system during the planning horizon
and the desired launch schedule for each. The Model establishes
when each of these satellites is actually launched and when each
fails and is to be replaced. Whenever a lainch is attempted the
Model establishes whether or not it is successful. If the launch
is unsuccessful a relaunch will be scheduled based upon possible
launch delays (the launch delay may be treated as an uncertainty
variable). The time to transfer from LEO to GBO (including the
time required for on-orbit testing) must also be specified.
Since additional transponder failures (those already in orbit on
other S/C) may occur during this time, long transfer and testing
times may have an impact on revenue.
The Model allows hybrid S/C to be considered as well as S/C
operating exclusively in a single frequency band. This is
accomplished by considering two classes (actually the classes may
be the same) of transponders - each class may contain a number of
groups of transponders containing a number of operational and
spare transponders. The number of classes (one or two), number
of groups per class and number of active and spare transponders
per group must be specified. All satellites in the business
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system are assumed to be identical. The classes of transponders
are referred to as narrow- and wide-band transponders - it must
be emphasized that the Model does not directly consider the
bandwidth characteristics of the transponders but only the number
of actual and spare transponders and their reliability
characteristics. The effects of bandwidth differences are
accounted for in the specified tariffs for the narrow- and wide-
band transponders. Thus, the number of groups, number of active
and spare transponders per group and transponder mean-time-to-
failure and expected and variability of wearout life must be
specified for both the narrow- and wide-band classes. Since the
survivability of transponders is effected by the S/C support
subsystems, their reliability characteristics oust also be
specified.
As previously described, four types of oouiuunications
services say be provided = 'tee specific services to be provided
by the business must be identified and the demand for these
services specified for each of the operational satellites as a
function of time. The demand is specified in terms of number of
revenue generating transponders each year for both the narrow-
and wide-band transponders. The demand may be considered as an
uncertainty variable. Also to be specified are the anticipated
tariffs for each type of transponder for each type of service
(also an uncertainty variable). This data must be provided
annually. Price elasticities need also be specified.
Since two different types of transponders (having different
revenue generation capability) may be considered it is necessary
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to specify a relaunch threshold in terms of both the operational
narrow- and wide-band transponders. When this threshold is
crossed another satellite (i.e., a replacement satellite) launch
will be attempted.
A launch scenario oust be specified for each year of the
business planning horizon. The specification of the launch
scenario is acronylifihfd by providing estimates of the
probability of success for each of the major steps in the launch
sequence. Thus, both Space Shuttle (i.e., reusable) and
expendable transportation systems may be specified by setting
appropriate probabilities of success to zero or non-zero values.
Different launch scenarios may be specified for each year of the
business plan.
Prior to the launch of the first satellite, the Model
automatically purchases a spare S/C and places it into inventory.
This S/C is then used for the next launch and another S/C becomes
i
the spare in ground inventory.
Insurance may be considered for launch and satellite cost as
a percentage of these costs. This percentage (may be considered
as an uncertainty variable) must be specified. If no insurance
is to be taken (i.e., self-insurance), this oust be explicitly
stated.
Annual cost of S/C operations, G&A expense (both fixed and
variable), R&D expense (both fixed and variable), and other
annual expenses (both fixed and variable) must be specified.
These may be treated as uncertainty variables. S/C unit
recurring cost learning rate must also be specified. S/C unit
recurring and nonrecurring and launch cost must be specified and
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nay be treated as uncertainty variables. The S/C costs are
establish other costs. Cost spreading functions (percentage of
expenditures made each year) nust be specified for S/C unit
recurring and nonrecurring cost and launch cost. Launch costs
nust be specified each year taking into account S/C attributes
and launch scenario.
Finally, other business related factors such as depreciation
lives, interest rates, tax related data, discount rates and
balance sheet related data must be specified to complete the
definition of the business venture.
The above data (provided as per the details in Appendix B)
conpletely specifies a business scenario. TVo base case business
scenarios were developed (in terms of the above data); one for
an FSS business venture and the other for a DBS business venture.
Spacecraft technology programs were identified by NASA together
with their likely outcomes. itiese likely outcomes were used to
specify the new technology that would be available for
incorporation into the base case S/C (see Section 4). The base
case S/C were reconfigured using the new technology so as to
maximize the value of the technology to the business venture (see
Section 5). The reconfiguration of the S/C, in general, resulted
in mass reductions that were put back so as to alter the
attributes of the S/C and increase capability. The mass savings
were used to extend satellite life and to increase the number of
available transponders. It was determined that for the business
scenarios considered it was of greater value to increase
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satellite capability than to use the mass savings to achieve
transportation cost savings (see Section 6}. Thus two business
scenarios were defined into which were placed the base case S/C
(i.e, without the technology that would be developed as a result
of the specified NASA technology programs) and new technology S/C
incorporating the anticipated results of the NASA technology
programs. The financial value of the business scenarios without
and with the new technology satellites was established - the
differences being the value of the technology programs to the
specific business scenarios evaluated. Specific results are
presented in Section 6 for each of the considered business
scenarios and extrapolations to satellite markets are presented
in Section 7.
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4. TSCHNCLOGY CONSIDERATIONS
4.1 Introduction
TWo technology improvements were chosen for consideration.
These were judged to be NASA programs which could most
significantly intact the utility of cconunications satellites in
the time frame of interest. Ion propulsion for North-South
Stationkeeping (NSSK) and Gallium Arsenide (GaAs) solar cells
were selected as the two technology areas to be analyzed for
application in the 1990 ti"*» frame. The assessment of the U.S.
technologies is largely based on information provided by NASA.
In addition, foreign technology in associated areas which would
compete with applied NASA technologies was assessed.
Specifically, European and Japanese programs in electric
propulsion and solar cell development were investigated.
The two satellites used as models represent the two types of
services which will be available from connunications satellites,
i.e. fixed services (point to point) and direct broadcast (to
hone receivers). These are compared with and without the
ijnproved technology assumed to result from the NASA programs. To1
further account for different satellite design philosophies, a
spinning configuration and a three-axis stabilized configuration
were considered. Both spacecraft represent current state-of-the-
art satellite designs and, in fact, similar satellites are now
being built for specific customers. In both cases those
customers are commercial corporations within the Chi ted States.
The two technologies selected for this study, inert gas ion
propulsion and Gallium Arsenide planar solar arrays, are
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components of the NASA Levis Research Center Technology Program.
Because of the limited tine and scope of this study it was not
possible to delve into the full depth of detail associated with
these technologies. However, an attempt was made to extract the
essence of performance improvements required to assess the impact
of these technologies on the selected spacecraft. The results
are representative of the improvements possible with the
inclusion of the new technologies.
4.2 NASA Technology
4.2.1 Ion Propulsion for Morth-Swfcfr Stflt^ ffikeeplng (HSf?)
Electric propulsion is an advanced form of space propulsion
that makes use of electrical energy to accelerate and expel an
ionized propellant at a relatively high exhaust velocity. In
contrast to chemical propulsion, the exhaust velocity is a
variable that can be controlled in the design and operation of
the electric thrusters. There are two generic types of electric
thrusters categorized as electrostatic and electromagnetic,
according to the mechanism used for accelerating the propellant.
In this study only the electrostatic type of propulsion,
otherwise known as ion propulsion, was considered and applied
specifically to a particular function, that is north-south
stationkeeping. This is the application that promises the most
important savings in spacecraft mass.
The particular electrostatic ion-thrusters of interest here
are sometimes known as the electron bombardment type. They
usually use a gaseous propellant which is typically mercury
vapor, xenon, or argon. These gases are ionized by electron
59
impact in a discharge chamber to form a neutral plasma. A
relatively— high~^ ltage^ T^ to~50W^
the accelerating electrodes in order to extract ions f ran the
discharge plasma and accelerate them to high velocity; thus the
exhaust is an ion beam. In order for such a device to be used
effectively as a thruster, electrons must be injected into the
ion beam in equal rankers in order to neutralize the exhaust.
The use of these high voltage accelerating electrodes and
associated heaters and discharge power requirements make a
significant impact on the spacecraft power system.
The inert gas ion- thruster is the technology of interest.
This represents the latest technology with respect to the
development of electrostatic thrusters and is the program
currently under development by the NASA Lewis Research Center.
This technology is taken and applied to the two baseline
spacecraft and the impact on the utilization and performance of
the spacecraft is developed.
1990 technology is assumed in all cases for the NSSF. The
ion-thruster spacecraft designs lead to an 8-cm diameter thruster
with a thrust level of 8.6 mN. An eight year mission life for
the fixed sources and a seven year mission life the for direct
broadcast satellites lead to a propellant mass of Xenon of 9.4 Kg
for the former and 8.2 Kg for the latter.
A typical ion thruster subsystem has major components
consisting of the ion-thruster, the power processor, and the
propellant tank and float control. The specific impulse derived,
based on various formulae and constraints on the spacecraft , was
found to be 2,926 seconds with a power-to-thrust-ratio of 32.2.
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The duty cycle for operation is assumed to be three hours per
day, every day for the mission. This will counter the
acceleration due to lunar and solar attraction. The details of
the system are given in Section 5.0.
4.2.2 foil inn Arsenide (^ VlAf) planar Solar Arrays
In the last 30 years, photovoltaic technology has made
inpressive advances in the U.S. space program. Performance has
steadily improved, durability and reliability have been refined
and costs held stable. For the past five years, the NASA program
has emphasized the laying of a foundation for high capacity,
earth orbital photovoltaic power systems. Such a technology
program offers the possibility of significantly reducing the mass
of the power systems of geosynchronous connunicaticns satellites.
With power system mass equaling pay load mass in present
technology, there are obvious opportunities to inprove spacecraft
performance for commercial applications.
Another aspect of geostationary orbital operation results in
the need to increase the radiation tolerance of solar cells.
Increased tolerance not only increase the end-of -miss ion (BOK)
power which reduces the size and mass of the array, but also
flattens the change (degradation) of power with time, which can
lead to power system simplification. The NASA photovoltaic
program has major targets of increased efficiency, increased
radiation tolerance and the use of concentrators in solar and
planar arrays with reduced mass and increased performance.
Concentrators have emerged as a cost effective, viable
alternative to silicon planar arrays. For exanple, miniaturized
Gall inn Arsenide solar cells with 19 % efficiency at 100 tiroes
concentration and 80° C temperature have been demonstrated. The
GaAs technology in planar arrays is applied to the spacecraft
configurations in order to study enhancemented spacecraft
performance due to the introduction of this new solar cell
technology.
Lightweight array technology continues to advance and is
near ing flight readiness. Lightweight designs with thin cells
have successfully passed 4,000 geosynchronous thermal cycles.
Thus, there is confidence in a greater than twenty-year
durability. Lightweight blankets require lightweight deployment
mechanisms, thus, reducing the mass of the mechanisms associated
with the solar array drives for a non-spinning spacecraft.
Gallium Arsenide solar cells have well-known advantages over
silicon solar cells, making them potential candidates for use in
a wide variety of space missions. The availability of these
cells will provide new benefits in terms of reduced mission cost
and increased mission capability. There are four major
advantages associated with the use of Gall inn Arsenide solar
cells: high-temperature operations, higher efficiency, higher
specific power, and increased radiation resistance.
As an indication of the impact that Gallium Arsenide cells
could have on cccnercial space missions, Figure 4.1 illustrates
power available in an orbit with 200° C annealing over a period
of 10 years. Thus, the impact on the geostationary missions of
these anticipated radiation resistant Gallium Arsenide cells,
coupled with annealing at 200° C is significant. In fact, the
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regulation of power output over the life of a geostationary
mission to within 5%, is a possibility.
A cannon misconception is that Gallium Arsenide cells have a
weight disadvantage relative to silicon cells. In fact,
conventional space blankets supply more power per unit mass with
GaAs than do silicon cells. Table 4.1 presents a comparison of
panel weights for silicon arrays using a K7 cell and a GaAs array
using 17% standard LPE cells, currently under Air Force
development. Both arrays are designed to provide the same power
at end of mission (defined as 7 years in geosynchronous orbit).
Not only will the total blanket weight be reduced by more than 6%
with GaAs but total panel area will be 27% less as well.
The potential for ultra-high specific power with GaAs far
exceeds anything achievable with silicon. With the anticipated
improvement in efficiency and reduction in mass yet to come, cell
specific power approaching 10 kW per kg now appear feasible.
Blanket specific powers in excess of 1.5 kW per kg should also be
achievable. This blanket specific power includes solar cell
blanket mass, mass of the covers and adhesives and cell
interconnections. Current space cell blanket specific powers are
typically 40 to 80 Watts per kg, a factor of 20 to 40 less than
anticipated for future GaAs blankets.
Solar cells intended for space use must withstand many
severe environmental challenges. A major concern for
geosynchronous missions, for example, is the degradation of cell
output caused by charged particle bombardment. Current
technology silicon cells will degrade as much as 25% or more over
a 10-year life. GaAs cells exhibit a degradation of only about
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TABLE 4.1 COMPARISON CF GaAs MO SILICON CELL MASSES*
Subsystem
Cell Assenbly
Adhesive, etc.
Substrate
GaAs
40.4 kg
5.7
18.9
65.0 kg
K7
35.7 kg
7.8
25.9
69.4 kg
*Panel Size Reduction: 27 %
Baseline: 2 X 4 on GaAs Cell, Same BCL Power as K7 Cell
(821 W)
250
200
150
, IT: vo
0 1 2 3 « S 6 7 I 9 10
4.1 POWER RTAILABLE IK OFBIT WITB 200° C AMffiftLDC
15% over the sane 10-year period. However, ccoplete radiation
resistance is not anticipated for GaAs or silicon. Therefore,
restoration to beginning-of-life (BCL) output by some kind of
annealing is desirable. In fact, GaAs is amenable to such
processes and can be restored to beginning of life output power
on a periodic basis. This then reduces or eliminates the overall
degradation of power available to the spacecraft.
Mission studies show that for certain mission classes GaAs
cells at a cost of $300.00 per watt can be competitive with
silicon cells at a cost of $100.00 per watt on a total mission
cost basis. Thus, GaAs solar cells do show many technological
advantages over silicon solar cells and appear particularly
suited for geostationary missions. Bower-to-mass-ratios as high
as 2.5 kW per kg have been demonstrated. Radiation resistance is
already comparable to that achieved in the best silicon cells and
annealability surpassing that demonstrated by silicon has been
observed. Thus, GaAs solar arrays have been considered for
implementation in the 1990 time frame. A conservative 1.5 kW per
kg is assumed for the blanket specific power of the solar arrays.
Associated improvements have been taken into account in the
developed advanced technology spacecraft designs.
4.3 foreign T>chnology
4.3.1 Ion Propulsion foi BSX
In fiprpary
The most extensive development of ion propulsion in the free
world outside of the United States has been in Germany. The RIT
series of thrusters have been developed to a flight ready status
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at the University of Geissen since 1960. [1] RET stands foe
Radiofrequency lon-Thruster and denotes a series of—thrusters-
wherein the gas ionization for the production of ions to be
accelerated is accomplished by the absorption of 1 MHz
electromagnetic radiation instead of contact ionization or the
method used principally in the United States of electron
bombardment ionization. A series of thrusters with beam
diameters from 4 on to 35 on have been tested using mercury as
the propellant. The RTT-10 thruster with a 10 on beam diameter
was chosen for industrial development by MBB in 1970 as its
thrust level (10 mN) was considered well developed at that time.
The RIT-10 thruster was developed for the APEX and H-SAT
satellites but both programs were cancelled. [2] The RTT-10 was
then developed for the German-French TV-SAT D3 teleccranunications
satellite but was deleted from the mission due to budgetary
considerations. As a result of these development programs, the
RTT-10 thruster has been extensively tested over long periods of
time. Using mercury as the propellant, the RIT-10 thruster
produces 10 mN of thrust with an exhaust velocity of 38 Ra/s.
Beam current is a maximum of 220 mA and beam voltage is 1.5 KV.
The RIT-10 thruster consumes 375 W of power and has been lifetime
tested up to 8150 hours.
In 1982, an opportunity to fly the RIT-10 thruster on the
European EXireca-I retrievable satellite materialized. The RIT-10
thruster with neutralizer, propellant storage and feed systems
and power conditioner and control is designated the RITA-10
system (RIT-10 Assembly). Due to contamination of the exterior
of the Eureca-I, which is to be retrieved by the Space Shuttle,
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the RTT-10 propellant was changed f ran mercury to xenon. The
RTT-10 thruster originally designed to operate with mercury was
found to provide similar performance with xenon as the propellant
with a slight increase in required electrical power principally
due to the increased energy needed for propellant ionization. [3]
Thrust for the RTT-10 thruster utilizing xenon as the propellant
is variable from 7 to 14 mN. At a baseline thrust of 10 mN, beam
current is 0.156 A, beam voltage is 1,500 V and the specific
impulse is 2,450 sec. Mass flow is 0.4 mg/s and total efficiency
is between 55% and 60%.
Due to the increasing size of geostationary comnunications
satellites, the RIT-10 is felt to have been outgrown by the
satellites it was designed to operate on. Therefore, work was
initiated in 1981 to adapt a larger RTT-15 thruster for use with
xenon. [4] The RTT-15 thruster with a 15 cm beam diameter was
originally designed to use mercury as the propellant but like the
RIT-10 thruster was found to work well with xenon. Thrust was
measured up to 16.2 mN at a beam current of 0.249 A and a beam
voltage of 1,550 V. Mass flow at this thrust value was 0.415
mg/s with an exhaust velocity of 37.2 Rm/s. Electrical
efficiency was 62.6%, propellant efficiency was 78.3% and total
efficiency was 49%. Ttotal power consumed is 617 W with 160 W of
the total going to the RF ionization system. Work is continuing
on the RTT-15 xenon thruster with a goal of 40 mN of thrust at a
beam current of 0.570 A and a mass flow 0.955 mg/s. Associated
goals are an exhaust velocity of 42.4 Rm/s, a beam voltage of
1,800 V and a total efficiency of 61.6%. The total required
electrical power at these conditions would then be 1380 W.
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In .Tapan
Although ion propulsion development in Japan has not been as
extensive as in Europe, there has been the opportunity to flight
test hardware. The Japanese effort up to this time has been
concentrated on a 5-on diameter mercury ion-thruster utilizing
electron bombardment propellant ionizaticn. TVo of these
thrusters were tested on the ETS-III (Engineering Test Satellite)
launched on September 3, 1982. (5] These engines were developed
by the National Space Development Agency of Japan. During the
flight/ measured performance duplicated ground-based test
results. Thrust was measured to be 2 mN at a specific impulse of
2,357 seconds. Beam current was 0.030 A and beam voltage was
1,000 V. Jfess flow was 0.1 mg/s with a propellant utilization
efficiency of up to 75%. The total ion propulsion system
including propellant and two thrusters weighed 22 Kg and consumed
100 W of electrical power. Che of the thrusters has accumulated
182 hours of operation in space.
A 20 mN class thruster test utilizing xenon as the
propellant is planned for ETS-VI to be launched in 1992. [6]
Projected performance for this thruster includes a beam diameter
of 12 cm, beam current of 0.480 A at the same beam voltage of
1,000 V and a thrust of 25 mN at a specific impulse of 3,400
seconds.
In France
The youngest of the ion propulsion developnent programs is
located in Prance involving the FEEP program. [1] PEEP stands
for Field Emission Electric Propulsion where the ion acceleration
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process is not obtained by the usual method of acceleration grids
based at high voltages. In PEEP a liquid metal surface is
subjected to high electric field causing cusps to form. At the
tips of these cusps, the electric field is high enough to
spontaneously produce ions which are then accelerated away in a
beam providing thrust. The particular design being studied by
the French firm SEP has the ions being emitted through narrow
(1 micrometer) slits. Performance has been measured in the
laboratory to be a thrust of 0.31 nH/cm at a specific iirpulse of
10,900 seconds. The principal drawbacks to the use of such a
system are that liquid metals such as cesium must be used as
propellants and that the high specific impulse requires a large
amount of electrical power to obtain appreciable thrust levels.
Finally, units are still far from flight testing.
4.3.2 Solai Cells [1-51
O/er the past several years, both the Japanese and Europeans
have been working steadily and intensively on the development of
silicon and Gallium Arsenide solar cells. In Japan, the leaders
in this development are Sharp and Mitsubishi. In Europe AEG
Ttelefunken is the principal supplier of cells. However, advanced
array structures are being produced by IBB, Fokker, Aerospatiale
and British Aerospace.
In Japan, the Sharp Corporation in conjunction with NASDA,
the National Aerospace Development Agency of Japan, has been
developing ultrathin solar cells which have been qualified for
space. These use a 55 micrometer thick silicon wafer. In order
to recover the loss of electrical output caused by thinning
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substrates, the manufacturing process has been improved recently.
Dltrathin cells of size 2 on x 2 en which were fabricated by this
new process have shown outputs of 72.5 nW. This represents an
increase of 1.8 a*? over that of the 280 micrometer thick cells
fabricated by the conventional method.
Mitsubishi in conjunction with NASDA has developed some
Gallium Arsenide cells with higher performance in radiation
resistance and energy conversion efficiency as compared to
conventional silicon cells. Test results indicate that 2 cm x 2
cm Gallium Arsenide cells have efficiencies ranging from 16.4 to
18.6%. A typical value is 17.5%. This represents an output for
this cell of 94.7 mW.
Solar array development in Europe is typified by the
activities of Fokker Space Division. Here activities include the
construction of complete solar array subassemblies which are
supplied to satellite prime contractors. Fokker has attempted to
set up a generic solar array design for 3-azis stabilized
satellites which provides prime contractors with a number of
technical and commercial degrees of freedom. This design allows
the spacecraft builder to tune the array properties to their
specific requirements without the need for extensive redesign.
The array supplies power in the range of 2 to 4 kW at end of
life. This design is called the Advanced Rigid Array and
consists of a rigid, panel type solar array. A number of panels
can be selected (between 3 and 7). This design is capable of
achieving or exceeding 30 to 40 K/fcg for the complete array
subsystem including the satellite sidevall mounted substructures.
Table 4.2 summarizes large solar arrays being developed in
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Europe. Two of these, the ARA and the L-SftT represent new
developments while the others have already been developed.
Existing European arrays have considerable growth capabilities.
TABLE 4.2 LARGE SCLAR ARRAYS DJ EUROPE
Name
GSR
OLP
ARA
DORA
ST
SPOT
L-SAT
Type BGL Equinox
Rigid Panel Fold-out
Rigid Frame Fold-out
Rigid Panel Fold-out
Double Roll-out
Double Roll-out
Flexible Fold-out
Flexible Fold-out
Tested
3
3
(3)
9
5
2.6
4.2
Power (KJO
Growth
6
10
6
(20?)
10
10-12
11
Retraction
+
4
+
71
5. SPACECRAFT CONFIGURATIONS AND COSTS
57l Introduction
Two spacecraft configurations were selected as being
representative of the cconunications satellite industry. These
two configurations consisted of a fixed services satellite and a
direct broadcast satellite. Further considerations included the
fundamental question of stabilization technique. Since there are
two approaches to this problem ( i.e., spin stabilization and
three-axis stabilization), it was deemed appropriate to select
one of these two satellites as a spinner and one as a non-
spinner. Therefore, the fixed services satellite was selected to
be the spinning configuration, based on Hughes Aircraft Corpany
designs. The configuration is a dual spin satellite with
deployable solar array skirt and a high gain earth oriented
antenna. This is in fact the current state of the art for such
spacecraft of this configuration. The direct broadcast satellite
was selected to be the non-spiming or three-axis stabilized
configuration. This design is typical of many conrounication
satellites built by RCA, Ford Aerospace & Ccranunications
Corporation and General Electric. It also represents current
state of the art technology concerning the subsystems.
A great deal of detailed design information was available
on these two spacecraft. This information was utilized in
developing the baseline designs, as shown in the following
sections. However, only those design aspects which were
pertinent to the study have been included here.
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5.2 Filfid. Services Satellite
5.2.1 Baseline Qesiga
The baseline Fixed Services Satellite design selected for
this study Is based on the Hughes Aircraft Company product line,
BS 376. This is a dual-spin satellite with deplcyable solar
array skirt and a high-gain, earth oriented antenna, as
illustrated in Figure 5.1.
This spacecraft is designed to provide full functional
capability over an 8-year mission life. The mission probability
of success, with 16 channels operating, exceeds 0.80. The
payload capability is similar to Anik C and SBS, and consists of
a shared aperature, dual-polarized antenna system complementing a
16-channel ccanunicaticns repeater. The repeater closely
resembles that of Anik C; the antenna reflector and the
mechanical deployment features are identical to those of the SBS.
Shaped area and regional spot beams are similar to those of GTE's
GSTAR (Figure 5.2). The beam shaping technique is identical to
that of SBS.
gpa<y<rraf*' Mags and Power
The mission mass budget, including the derivation of the
spacecraft dry mass, is presented in Table 5.1. Table 5.2 gives
the spacecraft mass by subsystem. The mass margin for an
STS/PAM-D launch is 25.9 kg. This margin is for a satellite with
8 years of stationkeeping propellant. Since most of the
subsystem units represent existing hardware, their masses are
known with certainty; thus, the 25.9 kg margin is a conservative
one.
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DFIGORE 5.1 FSS BASELINE OITIGURATION
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TABLE 5.1 MISSION SEQUENCE) MASS HISTORIES (kilograms)
Mission Sequence STS/PAM
Mass into transfer orbit 1250.9
(Inclinaticn,deg) (27)
Hydrazine used in transfer orbit 3.5
Bydrazine used in preburn to augment ARM 75.1
Apogee motor propellant expended 508.1
Hydrazine used in drift orbit 13.8
Spacecraft, beginning of life
Hydrazine used during Syr
Spacecraft allowable dry mass 533.3
TABLE 5.2 MASS STOMAK? (kilograms)
Item MASS
Subsystem
Oonnunications
Antenna 45.0
Repeater 88.9
T,C & R 27.4
Attitude control 25.6
Reaction control 18.2
Electrical power 122.3
Thermal control 20.9
Structure . 96.4
Wire harness 27.2
Apogee motor case 31.0
Balance masses 4.8
Spacecraft dry mass 507.7
Total mission
propellant load 210.0
Mass margins at 8yr 25.9
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TABLE 5.3 POWER SMOKY
Power
Requirement
Subsystem Sunlight Eclipse
Oonnunications, W 695.0 695.0
Bus, W 121.9 226.3
Total, W 816.9 921.3
Solar array
margin, % 3.5
Battery DCD, % 49.9
The power requirements are summarized in Table 5.3. The
solar panels provide a power margin in excess of 3.5 percent
after 8 years of operation with 16 channels operating. This
provides for uncertainties in the radiation environment. A
simple extension of the aft solar panel by 20.3 on could provide
an additional 50 watts. The batteries are sized for 50 percent
depth of discharge (DCD) at the beginning of life to ensure 8
years of on-orbit lifetime.
Sbacecraft Design
The baseline ESS spacecraft is a spin-stabilized
configuration with a deployable antenna system consisting of a
dual-gridded shared aperture reflector for coranunications and a
pair of Ku band onni antennas for telemetry and ccranand (T & C).
The spacecraft consists of two basic sections: a spinning
section which contains the power, propulsion, T & C digital
electronics, and most of the attitude control elements, and a
despun section containing, essentially, the conraunications and T
6 C equipment. Figure 5.3 illustrates the general arrangement,
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BASaiNE SPACECRAFT SYSTEM fflARACIgUSTICS
Attribute
SIZE, cm.
Spacecraft diameter
Solar drun height
Forward drum (fixed)
Aft drun (extensible)
Overall height
Transfer/drift orbit
Geosynchronous orbit
Similar designs
MASS, kg.
Spacecraft/PAM at PAH ignition
Spacecraft in transfer orbit
Ch station
BCL
EX, max allowable
Spacecraft dry mass
Margin
gCftBILIZATTCK
Spacecraf t/PAM coast .
Transfer/drift orbit
Geosynchronous orbit
STATICNKEEPING
Longitude
Latitude
Attitude (nominal)
MISSION LIFE
RELIABILITY
Spacecraft at 8 yr,
16 channels operating
Value
216.4
218.2
199.0
281.7
668.8
SBS, Anik C, Anik D, Palapa B,
Westar IV/V, Telstar 3
3402.4
1251.0
650.5
533.3
507.4
25.9
Spacecraft-supplied ANC
Roll-to-pitch inertia ratio
greater than 1.1
Gyrostat
Limit, deg.
+0.05
+0.05
+0.22
8yr
0.806
Correction Interval,
Days
21
28
6
offering a cutaway view of the spacecraft in its on-orbit
operational configuration, the spacecraft system characteristics
are sunmarized in Table 5.4.
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TABLE 5.4 FSS BASELIHE SPACECRAFT SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS (cent)
Attribute Value
SUBSYSTEM
Repeater
Receive frequency band, GBz
Transmit frequency band, GBz
No. of channels
Channel acfdifier redundancy
Channel multiplexing
Osable channel bandwidth, )Cz
Channel spacing, JBz
Receiver redundancy
Receiver noise figure, dB
Antenna
Shared aperture diameter, on
Focal length, on
Polarization
Coverage
Receive
Transmit
Pointing
Connectivity
14.0 to 14.5
11.7 to 12.2
16
20 for 16
Even/odd
54
61
4 for 2
4.3
182.7
152.3
Linear, orthogonal
OCKJS and ONUS + Alaska + Hawaii
GONDS, east spot, west spot and CCNUS
and west spot combined with Alaska +
Hawaii
RF beacon
Individual channel to beam
connectivity conmand
Antenna pointing Two-axis beacon tracking
Backup mode Earth sensor
Antenna pointing error (including transients)
N-S (roll)
. E-W (pitch)
Beam rotation (yaw)
No. of tanks
System construction
Propellant
Propellant load, 8 yr mission
Max tank capacity
No. of thrusters
Redundancy
10.05 degrees
10.05 degrees
+0.25 degrees
Welded titanium
Hydrazine
210 kg.
211 kg.
4 (2 radial, 2 axial)
Dual halfsystems
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TABLE 5.4 FSS BASELINE SPACECRAFT SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS (cent)
Attribute Value
POWER
System
Solar cells
Cover slide thickness
Total array power
Cri station (BCL)
Solstice
Equinox
Cki station (ECL at 8 yr)
Solstice
Equinox
Panel margin
Battery system
Measured capacity
Depth of discharge, BCL
Recharge time at BX
Dual regulated buses with tap
limiters
High efficiency K-7; 2 by 6 on
typical
10 mil.
1066 W
1126 W
856 H
919 W
3.5%
2 Ni-Cd batteries
27.0 A-nr
Less than 50%
Less than 19 hr
The spacecraft bus is characterized by its two concentric
cylindrical solar panels. The launch configuration (Figure 5.4)
provides a contact arrangement, achieved by folding down the cmi
antenna mast and reflector assembly at their hinge points and
retracting the aft solar panel. In the final on-orbit
configuration, the spacecraft's spin axis will be parallel to the
earth's polar axis and the antenna end will be pointing north.
The two solar panels provide power in excess of 856 watts;
at least 31 watts (3.5 percent) of panel power margin exists at
the end of life with the payload complement of 16 channels
operating simultaneously. The solar panel power prediction is
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based on NASA's model for radiation environment, A7 cycle 20,
which is conservative.
Reaction Control
The reaction control subsystem (RCS) is typical of the HS
376 spacecraft. This design uses the Falapa B tanks which are
large, in order to augment the Star 80 ARM with a preburn to
provide a capability to carry heavier pay loads.
The key features of the RCS are as follows:
Gas pressure blowdown design
Positive propel! ant settling by centrifugal force
Two functionally redundant half -subsystems
Interconnect latch valve for redundancy
Monopropellant hydrazine propellant
Conispherical titanium alloy tank design
All-welded titanium alloy tubing
Qualified flight hardware
The propellant tank's were selected because their capacity
satisfies all requirements of an 8-year mission. The use of
redundant half-systems with an interconnect latch valve makes all
the propellant available to any thruster. The subsystem design
includes redundant beaters, blankets, low emittarce tape wrap,
and radiation canisters which preclude any operational
constraints due to the temperature environment. The gas blowdown
feature and centrifugal settling induced by spinning ensure that
bubble-free propellant is always available at the tank outlets.
The thrusters are capable of performing two times the required
operating sequence with thrust predictability maintained to
within +4 percent of nominal throughout the operational lifetime.
There are no restrictions on the number of pulses or the length
of continuous burn.
TABLE 5.5 BCS PROPELLANT ALLOCATION SWWARY
Hydrazine
Manuever Thruster Magnitude Mass
kg (Ibs)
Active nutation control
(before PAN ignition) Radial 0.2 (0.5)
Transfer orbit
reorientation Axial 134 deg 3.5 (7.7)
Preburn before ARM fire Axial 141.7 n/sec 75.1 (165.6)
(465 fps)
Injection errors Axial (N-S) 36.6 m/sec
(acquisition) Radial (E-W) (120 fps) U.I (24.4)
Spacecraft spin axis
alignment Axial 114 deg 2.8 (6.1)
N-S stationkeeping Axial 3996.6m/sec 110.3 (243.2)
(1311.0 fps)
E-W stationkeeping
Attitude control
Repositioning
Total hydrazine required
Maxinun tank capacity
Radial
Axial
Radial
0
(2
184
2
9
.8m/sec
.7 fps)
deg
,9n/sec
.5 fps
0
5
0
209
210
.4
.5
.9
.8
.9
(0.
12.
(2.
(462.
(465.
8)
2
0)
5)
0)
Table 5.5 Illustrates the propellant budget for the FSS
baseline design. Note that the two budget propellant users are
N-S stationkeeping and the preburn to assist the ARM.
In stannary, the PCS, shown in Figure 5.5, is located on the
^
spinning section of the spacecraft, and operates in a pressure
blowdown mode. Positive delivery of monopropellant hydrazine
from the conispherical tanks is ensured by the influence of the
local gravity associated with the spinning environment. When
commanded, the propellant valve opens and hydrazine is pressure-
fed to the thrusters which catalytically decompose it to produce
the required thrust.
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This subsystem cxnsists of two half subsystems, providing
full hardware redundancy, separated by interconnect latch valve,
each containing half the propellant load required for the
mission, fech half subsystem consists of two catalytic hydrazine
thrusters with a coraaon isolation latch valve, one propellant
filter, two propellant tanks, one tank isolation squib valve, one
pressure transducer, one fill and drain valve, and three
tenqperature sensors. If a thruster valve fails, the two tanks of
this subsystem can be connected into the other half subsystem by
ccnroanding the interconnect latch valve to open and the thruster
isolation latch valve to close.
Each PCS half subsystem contains a squib valve in the gas
manifold connecting the two tanks. The opening of these valves
is delayed until the final spacecraft erection to prevent
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propellant or gas migration and inbalance resulting f ran the
spacecraft's orientation during launch and transfer orbit.
Electrical power
Tbe Power subsystem for the FSS baseline design is
essentiaUy identical to that used on SBS and Palapa B. This
design provides the following:
* Power for ten 16-vatt and six 14-watt K<u> band communications
TWTAs over an 8-year mission life
* Solar panel margin at end of life (EQL) to compensate for
thermal and radiation environment uncertainties
* Dual, independent, balanced load electrical buses for
redundancy
* Use of the medium charge array to augment main panel power
at summer solstice
* Two flight-qualified nickel-cadmium batteries
* Battery depth of discharge not exceeding 50 percent at BCL
* Multiple battery charge rates
* Individual battery cell voltage telemetry for efficient
battery management
* Bus voltage control during eclipse and sunlight
The main components of the power subsystem are the solar
arrays, batteries, bus voltage limiters, discharge controller,
ciiarge/reconditioning unit, battery cell voltage monitors, solar
drum positioners, and switching units for beaters and the
telemetry/ranging mode. Table 5.6 lists the physical
characteristics of this subsystem. The major components are
located on the spinning section of the spacecraft, as shown in
Figure 5.6. Power is delivered to the despun section via the
bearing and power transfer assembly (BAPIA) .
Solar arrays consist of two concentric cylindrical panels of
n-p silicon solar cells. The forward panel is attached to the
main structure and is divided into two arrays separated by a
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TABLE 5.6 PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS
Unit
Quantity per
Spacecraft
Total
Weight
kg (Ib)
Design Features
Solar Array
Forward panel electrical assembly
Forward panel substrate
Aft panel electrical assenbly
Aft panel substrates
Racks
Solar drum positioner mechanism
Solar panel attachment
Batteries
Discharge controller
Bus limiter
Charge/reconditioning unit
Battery cell voltage monitor
Battery heater controller
lyrotechnic switch unit
Current sensors
Medium array switch unit
K-7 solar cells,
10 mil fused silica
cover glasses
1
1
1
1
3
3
8
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
8
18.1 (40.0)
21.3 (47.0)
2.1 (4.7)
4.7 (10.3)
63.3 (139.5)
6.4 (14.1)
2.8 (6.1)
0.9 (1.9)
0.7 (1.6)
0.5 (1.2)
0.3 (0.6)
0.4 (1.0)
0.7 (1.6)
Redundant motors
27 A-hr cells
Cne redundant IW.
regulator per batter
Four circuits per ur._
functionally redund^
Redundant relays,
ground corananded
Hybrid microcircuiti-
Redundant sense
resistors
Redundant relays,
ground conranded
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thermal radiator band, while the aft panel is retracted over the
forward panel during transfer orbit and extended to its operating
position in geosynchronous orbit. This aft panel is supported by
three longitudinal rack and pinion drives and is extended from
the main structure by the solar drum positioners. Redundant
flexible ribbon cables are used for electrical connections with
the aft panel. In transfer orbit, solar power is provided by the
aft panel only.
Eight nickel-cadmiun battery packs, each with eight cells,
are located on the periphery of the spinning shelf in proxiinity
to the thermal radiator. The packs are connected in two 32-cell,
27 A-hr batteries. The main power dissipating components, bus
voltage limiters, and battery discharge controller are also
mounted on the spinning shelf.
Characteristics
Spacecraft power is provided by two independent and balanced
load electrical buses, as shown in the block diagram of Figure
5.7. The main solar arrays are connected to the buses through
redundant isolation diodes. Redundant bus voltage limiters act
to limit the bus voltage to 30. (HO. 5 volts, except for a brief
rise to 42.5 volts on exit from eclipse. The limiters operate as
partial or tap shunt regulators, so as to load a portion of each
array rather than the main bus. This permits control of the
voltage while limiting the maximvra thermal dissipation. In
steady operation, the solar arrays supply all the required power
during sunlight conditions.
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During eclipse, bus power is delivered by the two batteries
which automatically assume the load as the solar array output
diminishes with the onset of the eclipse. Batteries are
connected to the spacecraft power buses through the discharge
controller which regulates each bus at 29.1+0.1 volts. During
sunlight operation, the discharge controller is in standby mode
since the main bus voltage is greater than the controller
setpoint. In the event that additional power is required to
supplement the solar array for power transients or fault
clearing, the battery will automatically come on line to supply
additional power.
Battery charge current is supplied by the current limited,
boost charge arrays which are connected in series with the main
arrays. Two trickle charge arrays and two median rate charge
arrays permit a selection of multiple charge rates throughout the
mission. Between successive eclipses, batteries are normally
charged in sequence at high rate, using all four charge arrays at
a time. During noneclipse seasons, the batteries are trickle
charged. All battery charging opertions are controlled by ground
conmands which switch relays in the battery charge/reconditioning
unit and medium array switch unit.
A sunnary of design and performance characteristics is
presented in Table 5.7. These data include voltages, power
capacities, and charging currents.
5.2.2 IQQ Propulsic
The baseline Fixed Services Satellite presented above has
been modified to include the use of ion propulsion for NSSK using
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TABLE 5.7 DESIGN AM) PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS
Bus Voltage*
Sunlight operation
Eclipse operation
Posted ipse transient
Main Solar Array BCL
Power capability
Summer solstice 1052 W
Autumn equinox 1129 W
Power margin at sunnier solstice 209 W
Power margin at autumn equinox 197 W
Battery Charge array
Available charge current
Trickle, Sunmer Solstice 0.43 A
High rate, Autumn Equinox 2.45 A
Maximum recharge time for 2 batteries 14.5 hrs
Batteries
amber
Cells per battery
A-hr rating, each battery
Maximum depth of discharge
BCL
Temperature control range
Battery Discharge Controller
Rated steady state output current (per bus)
Current limit (per bus)
1WTA Shutoff Voltage
Bus voltage
Solar Array Deployment
Extension distance
Deployment time (at 25 steps/sec)
30.0 + 0.5 V
29.1 + 0.10 V
42.5 V max
BQLififfi).
856 W
919 W
39 W
31 W
0.36 A
2.05 A
19.1 hrs
2
32
27
50%
5° to 20°
23.6 A
31 A
<26.5 V
210 on (82.7
75 min.
C (41° to 68° F)
in)
* With distribution losses, voltage at the load is 28V minimum
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NASA developed technology. The baseline satellite has thus been
reconfigured with the new improved technology - ion propulsion -
and the DOMSAT Model has been run with the resulting changed
spacecraft parameters. Foreign technology is also reviewed —
differences are discussed in following paragraphs. The ion
propulsion system selected for NSSK of this size spacecraft uses
gas such as xenon. Its duty cycle of usage is assumed to be
three hours a day on the average. A single thruster is assumed
to be used with a backup thruster on the spacecraft. The NSSK
requirement represents an average velocity increment of 45.8
m/s/yr. This represents an average acceleration of 1.45 x 10~_
n/s2 . Both spacecraft are assumed to have a BGL mass in orbit
of 625 kg. This leads to a daily impulse requirement of 78.4 N-
S.
In order to use the thruster effectively two effects most be
accounted for. The thruster will be canted away from the solar
arrays; in the case of a non-spinning satellite, up to an angle
of 30 degrees. In the case of a spinner, such as the Fixed
Services Satellite, there are other losses associated with
impingement of the plume on the structure. Thus, this factor has
been accounted for by assuming a loss of effectiveness of 13.4%
due to either canting or plume impingement. In addition to this,
the three-hour thrust interval requires that some non-ideal
impulse be applied as the spacecraft moves around the orbit.
Thus, the thrust effectiveness, due to a finite burn time of
three hours is calculated to be 97.45%. Combining these two
factors leads to an overall thrust effectiveness of 84.39%.
Therefore, the total equivalent daily impulse required of the
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thruster is 92.9% N-S. This leads to a thrust level over a 3-
hour period per day of 8.6 nti. Using an 8-year life for this FSS
mission, several factors have been developed that are associated
with the design of the subsystem.
The important design parameters that were derived based on
the above assumptions are as follows. The bean current is 0.18
amperes with a specific impulse of 2,926 seconds. This leads to
an acceleration voltage of 923.9 volts and a power requirement
of 276.6 watts. The propellant load for 8 years is calculated to
be 9.39 kg. The power processor mass is calculated to be 5.54 kg
and the thruster mass is 4.56 kg per thruster. In addition to
this, a tank is needed to hold the xenon. Assuming a 5% margin
of xenon mass which gives a total propellant mass of 9.86 kg, the
volume of the required tank at 75° F in a 4200 PSIG is 593.9 cubic
centimeters. This results in a spherical tank of radius 9.7
centimeters and a mass of roughly 3 kg.
The amount of hydrazine allotted for NSSK in the baseline
FSS propellant budget is 110 kg. Thus, there is a significant
potential savings in terms of overall spacecraft mass, which
could be used in other areas. The total differential savings
between the elimination of the hydrazine and the addition of the
xenon is approximately 101 kg. In addition to this there is the
added savings of smaller propellant tanks for hydrazine. The
mass of the dry ion-thruster system which is approximately 20 kg
with plumbing and harnesses must also be added in. Net savings
for the use of ion propulsion is therefore approximately 90 kg
for the 8-year mission. This assumes that the baseline battery
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propulsion with a duty cycle that would be sufficient to maintain
orbital control. If this is not the case, additional batteries
and solar cells nay have to be added or coranitted to the ion
thruster system.
Foreign competition in ion propulsion for NSSK is discussed
in Section 4.3.1 and is represented largely by the Germans with
the Japanese following closely. The Germans are developing the
RTT-10 and have had some flight experience with it. This is a
thruster which uses mercury as a propellant and produces a thrust
of approximately 10 rtJ. It has a beam current of approximately
0.22 amps at 1,500 volts. It requires 375 watts of power and has
a tested lifetime of 8,150 hours. This thruster has also been
used with xenon with which it requires slightly more electrical
power. Thrust with xenon ranges from 7 to 14 mN, and could
therefore perform NSSK for the FSS. It has an associated
specific impulse of 2,540 sec. This implies that it is not as
quite a high performer as the NASA inert gas system being
developed by Hughes Aircraft.
The Japanese have also been advancing quickly in this area.
They have developed a 5 cm mercury ion-thruster which was flown
on ETS-III. The thrust level was only 2 mN at specific impulse
of 2,357 seconds. The Japanese are currently developing a 20 mN
type thruster using xenon. This is planned for a 1992 flight.
Thus, for the time frame of interest, it is felt that the
Japanese will not have a competitive system.
5.2.3 ScHi Cell
The effect of new solar cell technology on FSS was
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evaluated by increasing the cell efficiency from 13% to 18% and
making the appropriate adjustments in solar array size,
structural mass, thermal requirements, etc. The results indicate
some improvement in payload utilization and reduced spacecraft
mass, (14 kilograms) as indicated in Table 5.8.
5.2.4 Point Design with ftiyrcMgnentfi
Two point designs of FSS satellites were developed, one
which includes improved solar cells and the other an ion
propulsion NSSK system. Both designs resulted in a mass savings
at liftoff which was then "put back* into each satellite to
extend its capability. The satellite with the ion thruster
design had sufficient mass savings to allow for four (4) added
transponders and enough additional propulsion to extend the
lifetime two (2) years. This extended capability satellite has
the same mass as the baseline satellite (the satellite without
technology improvements). The satellite designed with Gallium
Arsenide solar cells may be designed with two (2) additional
transponders, without increasing the liftoff mass beyond the
baseline mass.
Table 5.8 sunroarizes the mass breakdown of the baseline
satellite and of the two improved satellites, both with the mass
savings and with the extended capability.
5.3 Direct Broadcast Satellite fDBS)
5.3.1 ppspiino pjesign
The baseline Direct Broadcast Satellite design selected for
this study is based on the General Electric camuni cat ions
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satellite product line. This is typified by BSE, BS-2, and DGCS
III. The selected DBS is three-axis stabilized and has a launch
mass of 1247 kg. Its configuration is illustrated in Figure 5.8.
Oonnunications Corporation, thus, making it representative of
most three-axis stabilized DBS's in its mass class.
This design is similar to that of RCA and Ford Aerospace and
TABLE 5.8 MASS SUMMARY OF IMFRCTED FSS SATELLITE (kg)
With GaAs With Ion NSSK
Reduced Extended Reduced Extended
Subsystem Baseline Mass Capability* Mass Capability*
Connunications
Antenna
Repeater
T C fc R
ACS
RCS (Bydrazine)
Ion NSSK
EPS
TCS
Structure
Harness
AKM Cfrfip
Balance Mass
BOM Mass
Mission N2H4
Be Pressurant
Xenon Load
Satellite
Liftoff Mass**
Design Margin
45.0
88.9
27.4
25.6
18.2
122.3
20.9
96.4
27.2
31.0
4.8
507.7
209.7
.1
0.0
—
717.5
25.5
45.0
88.9
27.4
25.6
18.2
in. 3
20.9
93.3
27.2
31.0
4.8
493.6
209.7
.1
0.0
703.4
25.5
45.0
96.6
27.4
25.6
18.2
121.5
21.3
94.2
27.2
31.0
4.8
512.8
209.7
.1
0.0
•^— ^— —
722.6
20.1
45.0
88.9
27.4
25.6
13.2
18.3
122.3
20.9
96.4
27.2
31.0
4.8
521.0
99.5
.1
9.4
™~
630.0
25.5
45.0
102.4
27.4
25.6
13.3
18.3
144.5
21.8
102.0
27.7
31.0
4.8
56571
140.8
.1
n.7
•
716.4
26.3
SateUite Liftoff
Mass Plus Design
Margin 743.0 728.9 742.7 655.5 742.7
* With 2 additional repeaters
+ With 4 additional repeaters and 2 extra years
** Excludes PAMD mass, cradle and apogee kickaotor propellent
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Except for orbit eclipse periods, this Direct Broadcast
Spacecraft will provide three continuously operating television
channels in the 17/12 GHz frequency with an RF output of 200
watts per channel. The spacecraft is provisioned for seven years
operational service life and designed with sufficient redundancy
for ten years. Its coverage area (Eastern Service Area) is
illustrated in Figure 5.9.
A complete accounting of the baseline bus performance is
presented in Figure 5.10. Included are power and mass margins,
attitude determination accuracies, and propellant capacity.
iflbjl ity
Spacecraft predicted reliability is better than 0.8 after
seven years. Table 5.9 shows the predicted reliability on a
subsystem basis, after seven years.
The predicted value of 0.844 is based on the probability of
0.933 of acquiring the required orbital station. If unity is
assumed, the predicted value at seven years is 0.885. Table 5.10
shows the predicted probability of survival for seven and ten
TABLE 5.9 SEVEN-YEAR RELIABILITY ESTIMATE
Subsystem Predicted Value
Cormunications 0.960495
Telemetry, Tracking, and Conmand 0.966081
Electrical Power 0.969717
Attitude Determination and Control 0.953745
Reaction Control 0.995976
Thermal Control 0.999968
Mechanical/Structure 0.994206
Apogee Motor 0.993410
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years for both on-station acquisition assumptions of 1.0 and
0.993. It also snows the expected survival time for a
probability of success of 0.8 for both conditions.
Figure 5.11 is a spacecraft system reliability sunnary
showing each subsystem, its ccngonents, and associated
probabilities of survival. Probabilities are for 7 years on-
orbit unless noted as transfer orbit functions.
The ccomanications design provides a balance between a
reliable hard-ware configuration and a high performance
television transmission system. The Connunications Subsystem is
compatible with either a Thomson or a Telefunken TWT. All
transponder components are located on North and South panels as
shown in Figure 5.12. These panels are removable as self
contained modules. Most of the communications components are
mounted on the North panel, with the South panel housing the two
complete transmitter chains for Channel A. The input and output
switching is also included on the South panel so that only a
single input and output waveguide running to the multiplexers on
the North panel is necessary. The symnetry of the TWTA
TABLE 5.10 PRCBABILm OF SPACECRAFT SUWIVAL
Probability of 7-Year Predicted 10-Year Predicted
On-station Probability of Survival Time Probability of
Acquisition Survival at 0.8 Survival
1,000
0.993
0.885
0.844
9.7 years
8.3 years
0.791
0.739
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arrangement facilitates thermal dissipation. All TWTA collectors
extend beyond the edge of the panel and radiate directly to
space. Each of the two panels is served by a dedicated Power
Controller. This provides maximum control flexibility and
minimum harness connections between panels. The simplified
coninunications block diagram is shown in Figure 5.13. The
transmitter switching matrix of Figure 5.14 indicates the
required position of the waveguide switches for the various
TWTft/Qiannel arrangement.
Spacecraffc Design
Figures 5.15 and 5.16 summarize the many design features of
each subsystem, list mass and power budgets, and illustrate the
spacecraft block diagram. The spacecraft is fully compatible
with STS/PAM-D launch vehicle interfaces and constraints. When
fully deployed, the overall length of the spacecraft from the tip
of one solar array to the other is 17.5 meters. In the stowed
configuration the overall height from the separation plane to the
top of the TT&C antenna is 2 1/2 meters. When deployed in the
orbital configuration, the height is 4 meters. To maintain
transponder temperatures, 15.8 square meters of north and south
radiating areas are provided. Three removable south panels
support all spacecraft bus (housekeeping) high heat generating
components. The two battery assemblies on the south panel are
thermally isolated and individually temperature controlled.
The transponder equipment installation has been organized by
grouping the six 200 watt TWTAs and electronics on two removable
modular north and south panels. The north panel supports four
105
'LfcJLA..,".*- T
CH .
X, i
I' T-
»' ix J;
I"1
Mi
105
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
C i .u r c - > - 2 u
2 -
C U
e J
107
! OF POOR QUALITY
!It||
.ili »:* "ii.!
:ii
! >
H!HIni i:s: I
If: §
! I
.!•!: Mi: «;i|si»Ihjll
H'hii=,ijiI Hi
I III
!.!
i iil!!! <!
• j!;i
! I!I
Mil HiHi :hh
1
•j
ii .i iH t| .1 J.
i| Hi !
•i Ms s s "2 *x • •« I • • ; I •
l! !
Wl
•
»
ii
s
5!
!i
H
.
•
)}
i ; 3 J 2 ;
i a • 5! : i
J * • * * •• ' • M l
i • • i * s
i 3 : - i « *
i i j i fHi idi ni l is
i
i
ii »
H :!
i ^
1 :
i !! ! ?! ! H
f f - ' S j i :5 j | j
-
j
t
• • « «« « -? ; «• *i *
:| t J* » »i * |s *| t
. i
Mi.1. ! i» « « i fi 1 H iiiiH|ii i iil I lit i |n in i
i
i
•
!
e
{
•
«
I
K
i
iihjiyiiii.Sr III - !!i iM
» • * • * » f :sr* i i ' • * * «
l i i f i \ l \ \ \ \ ihlij 111 Ihilili * IHl
il-.i
1
I
in
g
g
»-(
b.
103
ORIGINAL PAGE !S
OF POOR QUALITY
''ii'l 1"
109
-TOTAs—and-all-input/output nultiplexers and-waveguide_8witches.._
In addition, the power controller for power witching and for
secondary voltages is mounted on the north panel. Similarly, the
analler south panel supports two IWBte and a power controller.
The electrical power Subsystem (EPS) design provides
separate solar array segments at 56 volt for operating each
transponder channel, and dual 28 volt busses for spacecraft
housekeeping equipment. This design is a straightforward
approach to reliable broadcast operation that provides protection
against a catastrophic power bus failure.
The major elements of the design are:
1. A solar array segmented for 56 volt transponder
operation and 28 volt housekeeping functions.
2. A Power Regulation Unit containing battery chargers and
boost discharge regulators for redundant housekeeping
busses.
3. Two batteries rated at 12 ampere-hours each. Each
contains a Battery Switching Unit (BSD) for detecting
isolating faulty battery cells automatically or upon
ground cocnand.
4. A South Power Controller housing DC/DC converters and
switches which distributes direct and conditioned power
to load on the south equipment\panel.
5. A North Power Controller housing DC/bC converters and
switches which distributes direct and conditioned power
to load on the north equipment panel. This controller
also provides the control and distribution for the
transponder loads. It accomplishes load fault clearing
and affords source paralleling modes for operation under
degraded conditions.
6. An Ordnance Controller which operates on battery power
directly and activates electroexplosive devices for
solar array and antenna deployments.
7. A Shuttle Interface Unit (SID) which prevents enabling
of the Ordnance Controller until the CBS is safely
deployed relative to the Shuttle.
Each 56 volt array segment is assigned to a transponder
prijnary TWIA and its alternate. Using switches located in the
no
North Power Controller, the array sections may be inter-tied to
operate any three of the six TWTAs. Dhder normal operation, the
inter-ties remain disconnected to protect against source or load
faults. Any such fault is thereby limited to one section
permitting continued operation of the remaining transponder. No
batteries are associated with the 56 volt payload power source
and no fusing is used for fault protection. Since the 56 volt
source is independent of the 28 volt housekeeping source, faults
need not be cleared immediately for spacecraft survival. In-
stead, load faults may be cleared by ground command actuation of
the power switch serving the faulty TWIA. B>e inter-tie switches
also provide the means for extending mission life when each power
source segment has degraded to the point where it can no longer
support its' assigned load. With inter-tie closure, the combined
output can support the load of two of the three broadcast
channels. Similarly, two broadcast channels can be supported
with inter-tie closure should solar array occulations resulting
front lunar eclipse occur.
Power to each TWTA is ramped-on by a switch with transients
limited by suppression circuitry contained in the EPCA. Turn-on
is controlled by ground comnand. Turn-off before eclipse is also
controlled by ground conaand with backup provided by an
undervoltage cutoff. With turn-off, power is absorbed by
thermostatically controlled heaters installed for each TWTA.
Since no batteries are used in conjunction with payload power,
the -heaters may remain enabled through eclipse periods. tfccn
emergence from eclipse, all available solar energy is thereby
utilized for warming up the TWTAs before broadcast service is re-
111
established.
Each 28 volt housekeeping bus is associated with a dedicated
solar array segment, a partial shunt regulator, two charge
regulators (main and back-up) and a boost discharge regulator.
Loads are assigned equally to both housekeeping busses with each
load function powered from one bus, and its active or inactive
backup powered from the other bus. This is true of all
housekeeping loads except momentum wheels and gyro which draw
power from both busses through coupling diodes. Failure of one
or the other housekeeping bus permits uninterrupted operation of
critical functions during all mission phases.
React! en Control
A Trass expulsion hydrazine propulsion system with helium
pressurant and all catalytic bed thrusters operating in blowdown
(non-regulated) mode, is used for the baseline spacecraft.
Sufficient propellant is provided to accomplish the
spacecraft propulsive functions during a seven-year mission. The
two propellant tanks will accommodate a total propellant load to
provide for initial orbit attainment, North-South and East-Westi
stationkeeping, and the attitude control functions for the
required seven-year mission plus a margin of 20% more propellant
than will be required for the on-station phase of the mission.
proppllant
The DBS fuel allocation for the Reaction Control Subsystem is
based on the following requirements:
1. Application of STC specified V for correction of booster
related transfer orbit 3-sigraa errors.
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2. Performance of the transfer orbit precession to re-orient
the S/C out of the transfer orbit injection attitude into
the AM firing attitude.
3. Performance of the post AM burn despin maneuver.
4. Performance of the drift orbit precession to point the
spacecraft spin axis normal to the orbit plane.
5. Performance of 3-axis stabilization and post 3-axis
stabilization maneuvers.
6. Maintenance of orbit and attitude to specified limits
over the 7-year design life. Orbit maintenance requires
east-west north-south stationkeeping to ±0.1 degrees,
while attitude maintenance requires torque control during
stationkeeping maneuvers and periodic momentum wheel
loading with thrusting.
7. Allowance for 1 repositioning of the spacecraft.
8. Condensation for uncertainties in propellant loading and
weighing, residual fuel in the lines, expulsion
capabilities of the tanks, thruster coupling and
performance.
Figure 5.17 illustrates the locations of each of the
thrusters on the spacecraft while Figure 5.18 surararizes the
manner in which each thruster can be utilized for the various
maneuvers. The thruster location and groupings have been'
selected to provide the required orbit maneuvers while
maintaining conplete redundant operational capability with no
single-point failure capable of stopping the mission. Moment
arms, subsystem packaging and minimum thruster plane impingement
are other factors that have also been considered in the thruster
locations.
The nine thrusters in each group operate at a maximum
initial level of 4.45N. Biese thrusters provide the spacecraft
with North-South and East-West orbit adjustment and three-axis
attitude control during vehicle body stabilized operation. Pairs
of thrusters are selectively matched to a 1.6% thrust variation
band in order to minimize the thrust induced spacecraft
disturbance torques which the Attitude Control Subsystem (ACS)
must control.
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Average thrust efficiencies used in the determination of the
fuel allocation are sunrarized in Table 5.11. Also included in
this table are the causes of performance degradation for each
maneuver and its associated thruster. The fuel breakdown is
given in Figure 5.19.
TftBLE 5.11 AVERAGE THRUST EFFICIENCIES
Maneuver
Primary Average
Thruster Thrust
Number Efficiency Basis
Active Nutation Control 3 and 4 0.880
Precession (pre-Motor Burn) 3 and 4 0.890
Precession (Post-Motor Burn) 3 and 4 0.706
Despin 1 0.985
Initial Attitude Acquisition 1 to 6 0.732
15 and 16 0.994
or 13
Station Acquisition
North/South Stationkeeping 1 and 2 0.926
EastAtest Stationkeeping 15 and 16 0.994
Longitude Repositioning 15 and 16 0.994
Momentum Unloading
Torque Removal
1 to 6 0.437
1 to 6 0.722
Pulsing, Rotation,
Thruster Location,
Plume Impingement
Pulsing, Rotation,
Thruster Location,
Plume Impingement
Cant Angle
Pulsing
Thruster Location,
Plume Impingement
Cant Angle, Plume
Impingement,
Son-Impulsive
Ffaneuver
Thruster Location,
Plume Impingement
Thruster Location,
Plume Impingement
Pulsing
Pulsing
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5.3.2 Ion Propnlsiipfi Impact
The baseline Direct Broadcast Satellite presented above has
been modified to include the use of ion propulsion for KSSX using
NASA technology. Foreign technology is also reviewed and the
differences are discussed later. The ion propulsion system
selected for NSSK of this size spacecraft uses inert gas such as
xenon. Its duty cycle of usage is assumed to be three hours a
day on the average. A single thruster is assumed to be used with
a backup thruster on the spacecraft. The NSSK requirement
represents an average velocity increment of 45.8 n/s/yr. This
6 2
represents an average acceleration of 1.45 x 10"° B^ S . The DBS
spacecraft is assumed to have a BCL mass in orbit of 625 kg.
This leads to a daily impulse requirement of 78.4 N-S.
In order to use the thruster effectively two effects must be
accounted for. The thruster will be canted away from the solar
arrays for the non-spinning DBS/ up to an angle of 30 degrees.
This is accounted for by assuming a loss of effectiveness of
13.4% due to either canting or plume impingement. In addition to
this, the three-hour thrust interval requires that sane non-ideal
impulse be" applied as the spacecraft moves around the orbit.
Thus, the thrust effectiveness, due to a finite burn time of
three hours is calculated to be 97.45%. Combining these two
factors leads to an overall thrust effectiveness of 84.39%.
Therefore, the total equivalent daily impulse required of the
thruster is 92.9% N-S. This leads to a thrust level over a 3-
hour period per day of 8.6 mN. Using a 7-year life for this DBS
mission, several factors have been developed that are associated
with the design of the subsystem.
118
The important design parameters that were derived based on
the above assumptions are as follows. The bean current is 0.18
amperes with a specific impulse of 2,926 seconds. This leads to
an acceleration voltage of 923.9 volts and a power requirement
of 276.6 watts. The propellant load for 7 years is calculated to
be 8.23 kg. The power processor mass is calculated to be 5.54 kg
and the thruster mass is 4.56 kg per thruster. In addition to
this, a tank is needed to hold the xenon. Assuming a 5% margin
of xenon mass which gives a total propellant mass of 8.64 kg, the
volume of the required tank at 75°F in a 4200 PSIG is 520.3 cubic
centimeters. This gives a spherical tank of radius 9.3
centimeters and a ^ *-« of roughly 3 kg.
The amount of hydrazine allotted for NSSK in the baseline
DBS propellant budget is 98.8 kg. Thus, there is a significant
potential savings in terms of overall spacecraft mass, which
could be used in other areas. The total differential savings
between the elimination of the hydrazine for NSSK and the
addition of the xenon is approximately 90 kg. In addition to
this there is the added savings of smaller propellant tanks for
hydrazine. The dry ion-thruster system adds about 19 kg of mass
(including plumbing and harnesses). The electric power system
components are about 52 kg heavier with the ion-thruster. There
is thus a net mass savings of 28 kg for the use of ion
propulsion. This assumes that the baseline battery capacity and
solar arrays can handle the application of ion propulsion with a
duty cycle that would be sufficient to maintain orbital control.
If this in not the case, additional batteries and solar cells may
have to be added or committed to the ion-thruster system. If the
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margin is reduced by about 22 kg then 50 kg of «ss is available
to be put into one extra channel and two additional years of
life.
Foreign competition was discussed in Section 4.3.1 and
5.2.2.
5.3.3
The effect of new solar cell technology on DBS was
evaluated by simply increasing the cell efficiency from 13% to
18% and making the appropriate adjustments in solar array size,
structural mass, thermal requirements, etc. The results indicate
sane improvement in payload utilization and reduced spacecraft
mass.
5.3.4 point Design with ftryrovanents
As with the fixed services satellite, two point designs of/
DBS satellites were developed, one which includes improved solar
cells and the other an ion propulsion NSSK systan. Table 5.12
summarizes the mass breakdown for the baseline DBS, the DBS using
Gallium Arsenide solar cells and the DBS using icn-thrusters. A
mass sunroary is provided for both reduced mass and extended
capability for the Gallium Arsenide solar cells design and the
ion thruster design. The extended capability satellite using the
Gallium Arsenide technology is designed with an additional two
years of life. An additional channel and an additional two years
of life is designed into the extended capability ion-thruster
satellite.
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TABLE 5.12 MASS SUHMAK* OP IMPROVED CBS SATELLITE (KG)
Subsystem
With GaAs With Ion NSSK
Reduced Extended Reduced Extended
Baseline Mass Capability* Mass Capability*
Cccnunicaticns
Antenna
Repeater
T T & C
ACS
RCS (Bydrazine)
Ion NSSK
EPS
Solar Array
Assembly
Conponents
TCS
Structure
AKM Case
Balance Mass
BOM Mass
Mission N2H4
Be Pressurant
Xenon Load
Satellite Lift-
off mass -
Design Margin
Satellite Lift-
off Mass Plus
Design Margin
26.3
92.5
22.0
23.9
26.3
79.5
78.3
33.2
78.0
34.6
4.5
499.1
639.5
42.3
26.3
92.5
22.0
23.9
26.3
66.6
78.3
33.2
78.0
34.6
4.5
626.6
42.3
26.3
92.5
22.0
23.9
26.3
66.6
78.3
33.2
78.0
34.6
4.5
486.2 486.2
655.0
26.9
26.
92.
22,
23.9
18.4
18.3
79
130
33
78.0
34.6
4.5
561.7
681.8 668.9 681.9
611.4
42.3
653.7
26.3
120.4
22.0
23.9
18.5
18.3
93.8
130.5
34.0
79.4
34.6
4.5
606.2
44.4
.1
10.6
661.3
20.7
682.0
* With two additional years
+ With one additional channels and two additional years
- exclusive of PAM-O, cradle or apogee kick motor propellant
mass
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5.4 gost Analysis
The objective of the cost analysis was to derive valid and
comparable estimates on the price, to communications satellite
operators, of satellites using various levels of technology. The
analysis was separated into two segments; acquisition costs and
launch costs. fech of these analyses is discussed in following
paragraphs.
Ihe cost to a concunicaticns satellite operator of acquiring
new (or additional) satellites includes nonrecurring costs to
develop or modify the vehicle, and recurring costs to produce and
support the flight units. A general-case parametric cost-
prediction model, PRICE 'B* developed by RCA was used to estimate
all acquisition costs. Ihe analysis was performed in two steps:
* The cost of two reference or base case satellites (a
Direct Broadcast Satellite and a Fixed Services Satellite)
were modeled. Ihe estimated costs to the manufacturers
against representative sales prices for such satellites
were calibrated to obtain markup factors.
* Ihe costs of the sane satellites when they incorporate
important new technologies were estimated. The derived
markup factors were applied to obtain a new price to the
communication satellite users.
Ground rules and assumptions used in the analysis are as
follows:
* All costs are expressed in constant 1985 dollars {January
1 economic conditions).
* No full-system test articles are produced; however, at
subsystem and component-level, test articles are assumed
for the new-technology hardware.
* It is assumed that the new technologies will have
completed a feasibility demonstration phase at NASA before
being released to the builders. This implies that
although the subsystem design and technology would be new
to these contractors, there would be no major unknowns
that would require multiple development paths. It also
means that new hardware will have to be sized to specific
satellite applications and fully qualified for flight use.
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Price 'B1 is a general -case hardware cost-prediction model.
The term 'general case1 means that the model is, in fact, a
simulation of the forces that drive cost (e.g. size, complexity,
schedule) and is not based on specific, historically-derived cost
estimating relationships. Special case models estimate costs for
narrow product lines. A general case hardware model can estimate
the cost of any manufactured product, provided that the model is
given a technical and programmatic description of the product,
and provided that the model variables have been calibrated to
that product.
Specific questions, the responses to which form the input
data set for the Price 'B1 model are as follows:
* Hbat ifi the product? Is it an electronic item, a
structure or a mechanism? Is it built to commercial or
Government specifications? If Governnent, must the item
operate in difficult environments such as ground-mobile,
shipboard, airborne or space?
* Bffl carylex is it? This is a set of variables that can be
calibrated in several different ways as described
subsequently.
* BfiK bJLg ifi ill What is unit weight? If an electronic
item, how much of total weight is electronics?
* BflH ™"y will be built? What is the total quantity of
items in production? Bow many equivalent units (fractions
acceptable) are to be built as test articles?
* Bow us* is the product? Bas this firm ever produced a
similar item? If so, what fraction of drawings exist?
Bas any such thing ever been built? Is the state of the
art beyond current capability, such that multiple and
independent development paths must be followed?
* Hben ifi it needed? Are the development schedules defined?
If so, what are start and end dates and key milestones?
Is the production schedule defined? Are there breaks in
the lot buys?
* BOM is it produced? What mechanical processes are
involved: casting, machining, sheet metal fab? Bow
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automated are these processes? Is the product monolithic
or built-up? Bow automated are electronic fabrication
processes?
* How is the ii-tm integrated into higher-level aggonbl ies?
Are special alignments required? Are special tests
required at higher levels? Do the electronics require
extensive calibration?
Using these inputs, the Price 'H' model can estimate
development and production-phase costs at exponent or assembly
level and can then project the integration/assenbly/test costs at
subsystem and higher levels. However, the validity of the costs
so estimated by Price depends in large measure on the accuracy
with which the driving complexity varibles have been calibrated.
The most significant variable in Price 'H' is the inherent -
complexity factor for structural/mechanical items, and for
electronic circuitry. There are three ways to obtain this
variable:
. Calibration; Running Price 'H1 with historical cost data
to extract this variable.
. ftnfllyt JGfll Formulations; Ds ing RCA derived or approved
equations to predict the complexity factors.
Dsing RCA-supplied tables 'of complexity
factors for similar products. Cost research has shown
that the electronics-complexity tables are far more
reliable than the structural/mechanical -complexity tables.
Regardless of which method is used to select the complexity
factors, the resulting cost' estimates must be calibrated in terms
of their consistency with the relative costs, sizes and
complexities of similar products.
The FSS and DBS development and production costs were
estimated at component level so as to incorporate the new-
technology subsystems and also to measure the effect of these
advanced technologies on the payload subsystems. Equipment
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lists, weights and quantities for each configuration of each
satellite were input to the RCA PRICE model. Complexity factors,
based on historical cost data, were also input to PRICE. The
resulting estimates predicted the cost to the satellite producer
of developing and manufacturing one vehicle of the configuration
defined. Learning factors for quantities greater than one were
derived using parametric PRICE model runs for multiple-unit lost
and deriving gross learning slopes to approximate the
cost/quantity relationship.
The resulting cost estimates for typical FSS and DBS
satellites are given in Tables 5.13 and 5.14. These tables show
the nonrecurring (DUTtE) and unit-recurring costs for each type
of satellite:
* Baseline: Current technology with heavy design
inheritance from existing ccrnmni cations satellites.
* Gallium Arsenide fftaAs^ Solar Cell Technology: The base-
line (current technology) satellite modified to
incorporate overall masc savings that can be achieved with
GaAs cells. These mass savings are converted into
additional pay load capability.
* Ion Propulsion Technology; The baseline satellite
modified to incorporate the p«gfi savings attainable with
ion propulsion technology. These mass savings are
converted into additional pay load capability.
The estimated costs for each satellite are sunned and an
estimated manufacturer's markup is applied to all costs to arrive
at a selling price to the connunications satellite operator.
The launch costs for delivering the various coraminications
satellite concepts to synchronous-transfer orbit were derived
using the most current understanding of space-transportation
standard charges. These costs were all normalized to 1985
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dollars for consistency with the acquisition costs.
The—user—charge^ for Shuttle transportatioon to low-earth
orbit was confuted using NASA's weight/length formula and was
based on a dedicated-flight price of $71 million (1982 dollars)
which is valid for 1986-88 launches. The calculation of STS user
charges is illustrated in Figure 5.20. Tt> this figure was added
the user charge for a PAM-D upper stage to deliver satellites
from low orbit to geosynchronous-transfer orbit. This is $5.6
minion in 1985 dollars.
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TABLE 5.13 FIXED SERVICES SATELLITE COST AM) PRICE SWKARY
WITH GaAs WITH ICN
BASELINE SCLAR CELLS PROPULSION
NR R NR R NR R
ANTENNA 691 1,749 691 1,749 691 1,749
T*ANSPCH)ERS 1,945 4,348 3,194 4,601 3,346 4,827
SUBTOTAL
PAYLOAD (2,636) (6,097) (3,885) (6,350) (4,037) (6,676)
TT&C 1,900 3,672 1,900 3,672 1,900 3,672
EPS 1,916 3,512 4,858 3,375 2,522 3,962
ACS 947 1,929 947 1,929 947 1,929
RCS 274 838 274 838 588 779
ION PROPULSION 7,313 1,589
STRUCT/THERMAL 736 1,532 736 1,532 736 1,532
AKM 119 193 119 193 119 193
SUBTOTAL
HARDWARE (5,892) (11,676) (8,834) (11,539) (14,125) (13,656)
SOFTWARE _ — — _ _ _
EIC ITEMS (8,528) (17,773) (12,719) (17,889) (18,162) (20,232)
SYSTEMS* 6,311 9,775 9,412 9,839 13,440 11,128
GRAM)
TOTAL (14,839) .(27,548) (22,131) (27,728) (31,602) (31,360)
PRICE (20,775) (38,567) (30,983) (38,819) (44,243) (43,903)
'INCLUDES ALL SYSTEM-LEVEL ACTIVITIES, I.E. FINAL ASSY., PRCGRAK
MANAGEMENT, SYSTEMS EN3R./INTEGRATION, SYSTEMS TEST, RELIABILITY/
QUALITY.
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WTTB GaAs WITH ION
BASELINE SCLAR raj.fi PROPULSION
* R NR R ffi R
AOTEWA 573 1,523 573 1,523 573 1,523
TRANSFODERS 2,333 4,645 2,333 4,645 4,042 5,366
SUBTOTAL
PAYLOAD
me
EPS
ACS
PCS
(2,906)
1,982
2,584
964
407
(6,168)
4,008
5,157
2,694
1,554
(2,906)
1,982
4,159
964
407
(6,168)
4,008
4,788
2,694
1,554
ION PROPULSION
STJSJCT/THERMAL 874
AKM 129
1,781
210
874
129
1,781
210
(4,615)
1,982
3,893
964
407
7,313
874
129
(6,889]
4,008
6,168
2,694
1,554
1,589
1,781
210
SUBTOTAL
HARDWARE (6,940) (15,404) (8,515) (15,035) (15,562) (18,004)
SOFTWARE 1,609 — 1,609 — 1,609 —
TOTAL
E2C ITEMS (11,455) (21,572) (13,030) (21,203) (21,786) (24,893)
SYSTEMS* 8,477 11,865 9,642 11,662 (16,122) (13,691)
Gtttt)
TOTAL 19,932 33,437 22,672 32,865 37,908 38,584
PRICE 39,864 66,874 45,344 65,730 75,816 77,168
•INCLUDES ALL SYSTEM-LEVEL ACTIVITIES, I.E. FINAL ASSY., PROGRAM
MANAGEMENT, SYSTEMS EICR./INTEGRATION, SYSTEMS TEST, RELIABILITY/
QUALITY.
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6. BUSINESS SCDftRIOS (FINANCIAL OTUCATICNS)
6.1 Fixed Satellite Services Scenarios '* . •
A typical but hypothetical fixed satellite services business
venture was planned to serve as a baseline case. The postulated
venture represents a carrier that launches and operates
satellites with the objective of generating revenue through the
leasing of transponders. The venture does not participate in
the broadcasting or transmission of data. The baseline
spacecraft is a spin stabilized satellite that transmits in the
Ku frequency band, based on the H376 model described in Section
5. The satellite has a 20 for 16 redundancy, with 16 active
transponders and 4 spare transponders. This particular business
is based upon placing and maintaining three operational
satellites in orbit. The first satellite will be launched midway
through the fourth year, and the second and third midway through
years five and seven. Satellites that fail or wear out win be
replaced subject to a launch delay (between .5 and .8 of a year)
and three months delay to allow for transit from LED to GEO and
on-orbit testing and check-out. The business will utilize the
Space Shuttle for launching the satellites, and will relaunch
when the number of active transponders (in a satellite) falls
below fifteen. Ch each satellite, up to 14 transponders win be
made available for lease as protected service and up to 2 as
unprotected at a price less than half that of the protected
transponders. Protected and unprotected services are defined in
Section 2.
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Data descriptive of the baseline business scenario for a
fifteen year period was established and entered into the data
base. The data base is presented in Appendix C and consists of
reliability and systems data (associated with the satellite and
the launch vehicle}, cost data (satellite unit and nonrecurring
cost, launch costs, business expenses, and capital costs),
financial data (such as tax rate, interest rate, depreciation
life, receivables, etc.), market data such as demand for
transponders, price and price elasticity, and decision data
points such as transponder relaunch threshold.
The data vere obtained in several ways. Spacecraft were
configured and the appropriate spacecraft parameters were used
with the RCA PRICE model (described in Section 2) to derive the
spacecraft unit recurring and nonrecurring costs, which were
entered into the DOMSAT data base. Appropriate Spacecraft
attributes from the developed configurations were also entered
into the data base (for instance, number of transponders,
transponders groupings, and reliability parameters).
Conversations with several carriers helped form the business
scenario by revealing sparing concepts, decisions that might be
made with regard to the use of spacecraft mass savings, and the
format of the financial statements used by carriers. Operating
costs, capital costs and financial data were obtained from FCC
filings and annual reports of the carriers. Market estimates
were based on data from the FCC filings. Transponder pricing data
was obtained through conversation with the carriers and current
published tariffs for the same or similar services to that
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postulated for the business scenario (see Tables 2.3 and 2.4}.
The—DGMSAT—Model-was-then-used-to—perform—the—financial-
analysis using the base case data. Financial results were
generated for later comparison with the improved technology
cases, The base case results are provided in Appendix C together
with the base case data.
The spacecraft were reconfigured using the two improved
technologies: ion-thrusters and Gallium Arsenide solar cells.
Mass savings on the order of 90 kilograms resulted from the
incorporation of the ion-thruster technology into the FSS
satellite; mass savings of 15 kilograms resulted from the
incorporation of the Gallium Arsenide technology into the FSS
satellite. These mass savings allowed four additional active
transponders and two years of life to be redesigned into the ion-
thruster satellite and two additional active transponders into
the Gallium Arsenide satellite. Extended capability was
therefore designed into the satellites so that the mass at
liftoff was approximately the same as the liftoff nass of the
base case satellites. The data sets were then adjusted with the
new parameters: new spacecraft nonrecurring and recurring costs,
the number of transponders, and the on-orbit life. The parameters
that were adjusted are displayed in Table 6.1 for each scenario.
All other variables were held constant. The DOMSAT Model was
then used to reanalyze the business scenario with the new
parameters and the financial results (ROI, profit, net present
value, etc.) were then compared with results produced frcro the
base case scenario.
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It was found that the nonrecurring costs associated with the
development of a satellite utilizing the new technology was a
major factor in establishing the financial attractiveness of the
technology. Since it is possible that nonrecurring satellite
costs may be recovered in different ways, several possible
situations were analyzed. Each new technology case was analyzed
with three different nonrecurring costs. One situation (referred
to as the first user) considered that the full nonrecurring costs
would be recovered from the first business purchasing the
satellite containing the new technology (for example, ion-
thrusters). A second situation (referred to as the later user)
used the same nonrecurring costs as the base case to simulate a
TABLE 6.1 PARAMETERS THAT VARY WITH SCENARIO
FIXED SERVICE SATELLITE
BASE CASE ICN-IHRUSTER GALLIUM ARSENIDE
NONRECURRING COST*
MINIMUM
EXPECTED VALUE
MAXIMUM
RECURRING COST*
MINIMUM
EXPECTED VALUE
MAXIMUM
NUMBER OF ACTIVE
TRANSPONDERS
LIFE (AVCS)**
$19.8
20.8
25.0
36.4
38.6
40.9
16
8 YEARS
$42.0
44.2
61.9
41.3
43.9
46.5
20
10 YEARS
$29.4
31.0
43.4
36.5
38.8
41.1
18
8 YEARS
* MILLIONS OF 1985 DOLLARS
** EXPECTED WEAROUT LIFE OF ATTITUDE, VELOCITY AND CDNISOL SYSTEM
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user of the technology after many applications so that the
improved technology satellite had been developed to the point
that the base case satellite has been developed. A third
situation (referred as the midpoint user) was considered as
being mid-way between the first two situations. Thus, the
sensitivity of the business venture to nonrecurring cost was
considered. The results obtained indicate the importance of NASA
pursuing technology programs through the satellite demonstration
stage in order to speed the introduction of the results of the
technology programs.
6.2 Fixed Satellite Services - fie suits
Several financial performance measures are considered when a
firm considers making an investment. In this section profit,
indebtedness, net present value and return on investment of the
three scenarios (base case, ion-thruster and Gallinn/Arsenide)
are compared to gain insight into the likelihood that a private
venture would invest in the improved technology satellites under
the defined business scenarios.
Expected profit of each scenario is depicted in Tfeble 6.2
and illustrated in Figure 6.1 for the first user of the improved
technology. The ion-thruster scenario incurs the largest losses
in the first four years as a result of the large increase in
nonrecurring cost. All scenarios turn profitable in the fifth
year. &As technology results in ijtproved profit performance
(relative to the base case) starting in the third year. Ion-
thruster technology becoroes more profitable than the base case in
the eighth year and more profitable than GaAs technology in the
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TABLE 6.2 FSS EXPECTED PROFIT - BASE CASE COMPARED WTTfi
FIRST OSER SCBttRIOS (THOUSANDS OF 1985 $)
YEAR
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
PROFIT
BASE CASE
(12324)
(5064)
(4666)
(2526)
24439
30766
38021
60060
64320
66072
68870
63728
60122
70289
70694
PROFIT
ION-THHUSTER
(10462)
(15879)
(10730)
(2573)
27319
30011
37067
64653
70082
70899
77092
81951
88608
93523
85160
PROFIT
GALLKK ARSENIDE
(12922)
(11041)
(4080)
(1390)
26844
31941
39539
65583
71164
72550
77524
73981
70308
80948
82213
INDICATES A LOSS
EXPECTED PROFIT
a»sc CASE vs
1ST LSEB
FIGURE 6.1 FSS EXPECTED PROFIT - BASE CASE COMPARED WITH
FIRST USER SCENARIOS
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twelfth year.
Results for the early years reflect the substantial increase
in the nonrecurring costs associated with the new technology
satellites (especially the icn-thruster satellite). In the later
years, the enhanced capability (more transponders and/or longer
life) of the new technology satellites have a positive effect on
expected profit relative to the base case. Because of the
increased capability, fewer satellite launches are required to
maintain a given satellite capacity (due to increased life) and
more transponders are available for revenue generation.
Similar factors are apparent in the expected indebtedness of
each scenario (Table 6.3 and Figure 6.2). Payback occurs between
the eighth and ninth years for the base case and Gate scenarios,
and between the ninth and tenth years for the ion-thruster
scenario. Indebtedness under the GaAs scenario is less than the
base case during almost the entire 15 year period (except the
first year). The peak of indebtedness is over $4 million less,
for the GaAs scenario than for the base case scenario.
Indebtedness of the icn-thruster scenario is higher than the base
case until the eleventh year.
Comparison of the scenarios portraying later users of the
technology (as mentioned above, the nonrecurring costs are set
equal to the base case nonrecurring costs) reveals a distinctly
more favorable outlook for the new technology cases. Over the
entire time horizon considered (except the first two years),
profits are higher (and losses lower) for both new technology
scenarios ccnyared with the base case scenario. In the latter
years the differences are greater because of the extended
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TABLE 6.3 FSS EXPECTED DCUfllLKESS
BASE CASE COMPARED WITH FIRST USER SCENARIOS
(TflOUSAH3S OF 1985 $)
INDEBTEDNESS
YEAR BASE CASE lON-THRUSTER
EXPECTED
INDEBTEDNESS
GaAs SOLAR
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
11014
42642
110872
168545
179411
170589
142323
77454
(1789)
(83143)
(160122)
(221992)
(280519)
(358298)
(446913)
9350
42925
113366
186057
202042
194133
171441
102814
15644
(74358)
(169188)
(269932)
(377146)
(486657)
(588226)
11549
34750
91339
160104
175065
165162
140257
70809
(16460)
(106727)
(196217)
(272038)
(338122)
(421174)
(518876)
INDICATES NEGATIVE DCtUTkUNESS
JOO
EXPECTED INDEBTEDNESS
-3OO
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FIGUPE 6.2 PSS EXPECTED DCEBTEDNESS - BASE CASE COMPARED WITH
FIRST DSER SCENARIOS
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capabilities of the nev technology satellites. Indebtedness is
favorable over the entire fifteen year period for the GaAs
scenario as compared to the base case. The ion-thruster scenario
has accumulated slightly more debt by the fourth through the
eighth years than the base case, but achieves a rapidly
decreasing indebtedness frotn the ninth through the fifteen years.
Tables 6.4 and 6.5, and corresponding graphs in Figures 6.3 and
6.4, compare profit and indebtedness data for the later users of
the technology with the base case.
Because the nonrecurring costs have been reduced
substantially as a result of the technology "maturing" and
industry gaining experience building the improved technology
satellites (hardware has been purchased, etc.), the improved
technology scenarios are not disadvantageous in the early years,
as is the case with the first users. later the positive effects
of the extended capability become apparent and the improved
technology scenarios are significantly more attractive than the
base case.
Occasional dips in expected profits, such as occurs in year
thirteen with the base case and GaAs scenarios, is the result of
additional satellite replacement launches.
Net present value for the infinite horizon at five different
discount rates is displayed in Table 6.6 for the base case and
improved technology scenarios. Figures 6.5 and 6.6 show net
present value risk profiles for the scenarios at the 15% discount
rate. At a 15% discount rate, if NASA undertakes the improved
technology programs, expected net present value to the first
users of both the ion-thruster and GaAs technologies will be
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TABLE 6.4 FSS EXPECTED PROFIT - BASE CASE COMPARE} WITH
LATER USER SCENARIOS (TflOOSAM) OF 1985 $)
YEAR
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
EXPECTED
PROFIT
BASE CASE
(12324)
(5064)
(4686)
(2526)
24439
30766
38021
60060
64320
66072
68870
63728
60122
70289
70694
jgU'EL.'lli*
PROFIT
ION-THRUSTER
(12326)
(5063)
(4108)
(1431)
28594
31383
38543
66242
71791
72738
79072
84081
90902
95991
87816
EXPECTED
PROFIT
GALLIUM ARSENIDE
(12329)
(5065)
(3624)
(854)
27421
32561
40207
66301
71937
73382
78419
74945
71345
82065
83415
( ) DOICATES A LOSS
EXPECTED PROFIT
IOC
90
FIGURE 6.3 FSS EXPECTED PRCFIT - BASE CASE COMPARED WITH
LATER USER SCENARIOS
139
TABLE 6.5 FSS INDEBTEDNESS
BASE CASE COMPARED WITH LATER USER SCENARIOS
(THOUSANDS OF 1985 $)
YEAR
INDEBTEDNESS
BASE CASE
DCEBTEDNESS
lON-TflRUSTER
DCEBTEDNESS
GaAs SOLAR (TTJ.S
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
11014
42642
110872
168545
179411
170589
142323
77454
(1789)
(83143)
(160122)
(221992)
(280519)
(358298)
(446913)
11016
35121
98496
169462
184186
174916
150760
80556
(8310)
(100138)
(196933)
(299792)
(409282)
(521243)
(625448)
11019
28817
84363
152601
166990
156471
130903
60743
(27294)
(118387)
(208765)
(285542)
(352656)
(436815)
(535710)
INDICATES NEGATIVE INDEBTEDNESS
EXPECTED INDEBTEDNESS
mix CASE vs LATE* usens
-700
* ION
FIGURE 6.4 FSS EXPECTED INDEBTEDNESS - EASE CASE COMPARED WITH
LKTER DSER SCENARIOS
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TABLE 6.6 JET PRESENT VALUE* (MILLIOKS OF 1985 $)
XT VARIOUS DISCOUNT PATES
SCENARIO
BASE CASE
ION-THRUSTER
FIRST DSER
ION-THRUSTER
LATER DSER
DISCOUNT RATES
10 15 20 25 40
$279.4 $ 84.2 $10.2 $(22.1) $(45.0)
341.6 109.0 19.7 (19.5) (47.9)
367.9 127.3 34.0 (7.8) (40.3)
GaAs FIRST
USER
GaAs LATER
USER
326.7
338.9
109.4
118.1
26.2
33.1
(10.6)
(4.8)
(38.8)
(34.7)
( ) INDICATES A NEGATIVE PRESENT VALUE
* INFINITE HORIZON
NPV RISK PRORLES (15%)
100
or • f)
FIGURE 6.5 NET PRESENT VALUE AT 15% DISCOUNT RATE
BASE CASE VS FIRST DSER SCENARIOS
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NPV RISK PROFILES (15%)
-100
o ao *o *o ao «oc> 130
FIGURE 6.6 NET PRESENT VALUE AT A 15% DI900UNT RATE
BASE CASE VS LATER USER SCENARIOS
approximately $25 million more than the base case. Once
nonrecurring cost have been reduced to the base case level, the
ion-thruster technology will generate an additional $18 million
in net present value, and the Gallium Arsenide technology an
additional $9 mlllicn.
Table 6.7 displays the expected return on investment
(internal rate of return) and risk (the standard deviation of
ROD associated with each of the scenarios. The internal rate of
return is the value of the discount rate that yields a present
value of zero. If the internal rate of return is greater than
the cost of capital it is desirable to pursue the venture.
Comparison of the expected ROI and the risk of the improved
technology scenarios with the base case scenario leads to an
interesting observation. There are small differences between the
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TABLE 6.7 BCPECTED ROI Al*> RISK: BASE CASE COMPARED
EXPECTED ROI
RISK
EASE CASE
21.3%
2.9%
ION-THRUSTER
FIRST USER
22.1%
2.5%
GaAs
FIRST USER
23.2%
2.4%
EXPECTED ROI
RISK
EASE CASE ION-THRUSTER GaAs
MIDPOINT USER MIDPOINT USER
21.3%
2.9%
22.9%
2.5%
23.6%
2.4%
EXPECTED ROI
RISK
BASE CASE
21.3%
2.9%
ION-THRUSTER
LATER USER
23.7%
2.5%
GaAs
LATER USER
24.0%
2.4%
financial performance measures of the base case and the first
user of the ion-thruster. These differences may be inadequate to
gain early acceptance of the new technology by the private sector
for connercial applications especially in light of the following.
Reliability (mean-time-to-failure) of the ion-thruster in
the above described scenarios was assumed to be the same as the
base case. Inadequate reliability data is available on ion-
thruster technology to have confidence in the reliability
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estimates utilized in the analysis. Reliability of this new
technology could actually 1* lower than the base case
reliability. Even if actual reliability is not lower,
reliability could be perceived as low in the early use of the
technology. In order to assess the impact of reliability, an
analysis was performed which used an Attitude, Velocity and
Control System (AVCS) mean-time-to-fallure of 75 years
(associated witji a reliability of .899). The resulting expected
RDI was 21.7 percent and the risk was 2.7 percent.
The first user may be discouraged by the fact that the
technology is as yet unproven and risk could be perceived as
high. This would most likely negate any slight advantage in
expected RDI and risk that the ion-thruster scenario has over the
base case. Furthermore because of the higher perceived risk,
insurance rates are likely to be higher or insurance may not be
available at all; this also would impact the financial results.
(with the current high insurance rates and capacity limits it is
important to consider technology programs and the insurance rate
implications.)
The results indicate that there may be difficulty in
motivating use of the technology because of increased
nonrecurring cost and lack of sufficient reliability data. Chce
the technology has been applied, nonrecurring costs can be
brought down and the difference in the expected RDI and risk for
the later users may then be sufficient to induce later users to
turn to this technology rather than continue with the base case
technology. The results indicate that there would be difficulty
144
in motivating use of the technology if nonrecurring costs are not
reduced and reliability demonstrated.
Nonrecurring costs of the first user were developed for an
ion-thruster spacecraft for which only a feasibility
demonstration was performed by NASA. The first user was assumed
to bear the costs of qualifying the spacecraft and setting a
standard modular design. If NASA chooses to encourage the
technology then, based on the preceding analysis two steps may be
taken. NASA may qualify the spacecraft. This would reduce the
number of test articles that the contractor has to build. NASA
could reduce costs further by producing a standard modular
design. NASA may overcome industry reluctance to use ion-
thruster technology by going beyond the research and development
program to actually design and test a first prototype of the ion-
thruster satellite. If NASA can in this way reduce the
nonrecurring costs and demonstrate reliability (so as to reduce
perceived risk), then the likelihood of the private sector
utilizing the technology may be increased significantly.
Otherwise, judging from the particular business scenarios
considered in this study, it does not appear likely that the
technology will be quickly adopted by the private sector.
Gallium Arsenide solar cell technology looks more promising.
Both the expected ROI and the risk are clearly better than the
base case scenario, even for the first user.
A number of plausible scenarios may be considered regarding
the development of the urproved technology, by the U.S. or the
Europeans.
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o The O.S. does not fund research and development into the
new technology but the Europeans continue R&D but don't
bring-down-nonrecurring-costs and
o The O.S. does not fund research and development of the
new technology, and the Europeans continue RiD and
significantly reduce nonrecurring costs and risk.
o Both the D.S. and Europe develop the technology, but
neither significantly reduce the risk and nonrecurring
costs.
o Both the D.S. and Europeans develop the technology but
only the Europeans significantly reduce the risk and
nonrecurring costs.
o Both the D.S. and Europeans develop the technology and
only the D.S. significantly reduces the nonrecurring
costs and decreases risk.
o Both the O.S. and Europeans develop the technology and
both significantly reduce risk and nonrecurring costs.
Each of these scenarios has different implications for
private sector adoption of the technology and the O.S. foreign
trade picture. The second and fourth scenarios could result in
the D.S. risking a portion of its potential market for
satellites. This is discussed further in Section 7.2. The sixth
scenario could mean that the technology is adapted and that the
D.S. and Europe are on an equal footing competitively or that the
D.S. is at an advantage.
6.3 pirect BrOflfoflSt Cervices gcenarios
A direct broadcast satellite business venture was
hypothesized. The DBS satellite configured for the venture was
based on the GE three-axis stabilized, high power (200 watt)
satellite as described in Section 5. The business venture is
based upon a two satellite system, launched on the Space Shuttle,
with each satellite to serve one half the continental United
States (CCNUS). The second satellite is planned for launch six
months after the first. Che type of service is to be offered.
The transponders are in two groups. One group has a 4/2
redundancy configuration in which two spares back up two active
transponders. The other has a 2/1 redundancy with 1 active
transponder backed up by 1 spare.
A competitive market was envisioned for the high power CBS
satellite because of the probability that low power fixed
services satellites will be used to provide CBS service
initially. Therefore price elasticity was assumed to be higher
than unit elasticity (1.4). Lower prices were set in the first
four years of satellite operation with the rationale that
competition from lower powered systems would initially keep the
price down. In later years prices rise as the market discovers
that higher powered systems are better suited for DBS.
The analysis proceeded in the same manner as with the fixed
services satellite scenarios, where reliability, cost, market and
financial data make up a data base (see Appendix C) describing
the postulated business scenario. Financial statements were
generated for the base case scenario. The spacecraft was then
reconfigured, once utilizing the ion-thruster technology and once
utilizing the Gallium Arsenide solar cell technology.
When reconfigured utilizing the ion-thruster technology the
satellite mass is reduced by approximately 28 kilograms. If the
margin is reduced by another 22 kilograms, one additional
transponder and two additional years of on-orbit propulsion
system life can be designed into the satellite without increasing
the mass beyond the base case liftoff mass. The satellite when
reconfigured utilizing the Gallium Arsenide solar cells can
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achieve a mass reduction of 13 kilograms. If another 15 kilograms
is—taken—f rcnr~the margin^—two^additional^years—of—on=orbit~
propulsion system life may be achieved while maintaining the same
liftoff mass as the base case satellite.
The data bases were adjusted with appropriate parameters
describing the two "extended capability9 satellites and the
financial statements representing the new improved technology
scenarios were generated. The parameters that are changed to
describe the new scenarios are, the number of transponders and
additional years of life, nonrecurring and recurring costs.
These parameters are displayed in Table 6.8. All other
parameters were held constant with the base case scenario.
Analyses were performed with two different nonrecurring costs to
TABLE 6.8 PARAMETERS THAT VARY WITH SCENARIO
DIRECT BROADCAST SATELLITE
BASE CASE ICN-TBRUSTER GALLIUM ARSENIDE
NONRECURRING
OOST*
MINIMUM
EXPECTED VALUE
MAXIMUM
RECURRING COST*
MINIMUM
EXPECTED VALUE
MAXIMUM
NUMBER OF ACTIVE
LIFE (AVCS)
TRANSPONDERS
_ _ - -, . - _ - - - - _
$19.8
20.8
25.0
36.4
38.6
40.9
3
7 YEARS
. . . _ , _ .,,
$ 72.0
75.8
113.7
71.8
77.2
82.6
4
9 YEARS
-. . .._ -
$43.0
45.3
67.9
61.1
65.7
70.2
3
9 YEARS
* MILLIONS OF 1985 DOLLARS
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represent a first user, and a later user.
6.4 fiirect Broafofl'rt Satellite - Results
Use of the ion-thruster technology satellites by the
typical DBS venture results in a reduction of expected profit and
an increase in indebtedness (compared to the base case) in the
near-term. In the long-term, profit is increased and
indebtedness is decreased. The effects of the use of Gallium
Arsenide solar cell technology are not as marked: in the near-
term the impacts are slightly negative or insignificant while in
the long-term the effects are distinctly better than the base
case but not a good as the ion-thruster scenario.
The particular DBS business scenario and S/C configuration
selected for the analysis is not likely to be financially viable,
judging from the financial statements generated by the base case
analysis. This should not be generalized since these results
reflect only the particular scenario and configuration chosen and
do not mean that other DBS business scenarios would be
unattractive. It was hoped that application of the improved
technologies might turn a marginally unattractive business
venture into an attractive one. Unfortunately, this does not
appear to be the case for the specific technologies and business
scenario considered.
In the early years of the venture the improved technology
first user scenarios incur larger losses and higher indebtedness
(especially the ion-thruster scenario) than the base case because
of the higher nonrecurring costs. From the seventh year on the
difference in capability of the improved technology satellites
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become apparent as expected profit of the improved technology
scenarios begins and continues to exceed the base case expected
profit. In the eleventh and twelfth years the base case profit
dips significantly due to satellite replacement launches, while
the improved technology scenarios (with enhanced capability
satellites) maintain profit levels. Expected profit is displayed
in Tables 6.9 and 6.10 and illustrated in Figures 6.7 and 6.8.
Indebtedness in the base case is positive during the entire
fifteen period; the payback period in the base case therefore
exceeds fifteen years. The improved technology scenarios have
payback periods of thirteen and fourteen years for the first user
scenarios and twelve and thirteen years for the later user
scenarios. The magnitude of indebtedness is greater (and often
subtantially greater) under the ion-thruster scenarios than the
base case until the eleventh (first user) or tenth (later user)
years. A comparison of expected indebtedness for each of the
scenarios is presented in Tables 6.11 and 6.12 and Figures 6.9
and 6.10.
Net present value is negative at all five discount rates for
all scenarios. For an attractive investment, net present value
should exceed zero at the firm's cost of capital (discount rate).
By this criterion none of the proposed scenarios are financially
attractive investments. The application of the improved
technologies and use of the resulting expanded capacity
satellites have not succeeded in making this hypothetical
business into a financially attractive business. This may not be
the case for other DBS business scenarios.
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TABLE 6.9 DBS EXPECTED PROFIT
BASE CASE VS FIRST USER SCENARIOS
(THOUSANDS OF 1985 $)
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALTTY
YEAR
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
( ) INDICATES
BASE CASE
(22525)
(9498)
(7726)
(5341)
18457
14455
14441
22243
24377
25867
16722
6709
12820
22762
30826
A LOSS
ION-THRUSTER
(17572)
(27633)
(19255)
(8290)
18649
9423
21475
25162
27973
30134
33887
35782
28183
24373
28543
GaAs
(19025)
(16894)
(7946)
(5478)
18190
14639
15242
22804
25298
27604
30118
32111
23699
21574
25992
EXPECTED PROFIT
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FIGURE 6.7 DBS EXPECTED PROFIT - BASE CASE VS FIRST
USER SCENARIOS
TABLE 6.10—DBS-EXPECTED PROFIT
BASE CASE VS LATER USER SCENARIOS
(THOUSAMJS OF 1985 $)
YEAR
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
( ) DDICATES
BASE CASE
(22525)
(9498)
(7726)
(5341)
18457
14455
14441
22243
24377
25867
16722
6709
12820
22762
30826
A L06S
ION-THRUSTER
(22359)
(9443)
(7955)
(6485)
20670
11597
23816
27681
30684
33051
37026
39161
31819
28286
32755
f
GaAs
(22471)
(9480)
(7701)
(5156)
18535
15011
15642
23234
25761
28103
30655
32689
24321
22243
26713
DBS EXPECTED PROFIT
e
a
I
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FIGURE 6.8 DBS EXPECTED PROFIT - EASE CASE VS
LATER USER SCENARIOS
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ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
TABLE 6.11 DBS INDEBTEDNESS
BASE CASE VS FIRST USER SCENARIOS
(TBCOSANDS OF 1985 $)
YEAR
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
BASE CASE
20132
64616
159866
251318
269882
247561
218889
183832
146609
120068
117398
122603
103729
63203
15931
( ) INDICATES NEGATIVE
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ION-THRUSTER
FIRST USER
15705
79058
196805
303392
326944
306429
270934
228701
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135297
85330
44649
18069
(9449)
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FIGURE 6.9 DBS EXPECTED INDEBTEDNESS - BASE CASE VS
FIRST USER SCENARIOS
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TABLE 6.12 DBS EXPECTED INDEBTEDNESS
BASE CASE VS LATER USER SCENARIOS
(THOUSANDS CP 1985 $)
YEAR
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
( ) INDICATES
BASE CASE
20132
64616
159866
251318
269S82
247561
218889
183832
146609
120068
117398
122603
103729
63203
15931
NEGATIVE
ION-THFUSTER
LATER USER
19984
67588
173302
277075
298629
275956
238138
193406
145370
94416
41332
(2702)
(32891)
(64294)
(105257)
INDEBTEDNESS
GaAs
LATER USER
20083
64294
158439
247600
263719
239818
210055
174224
134338
91972
48479
12732
(9991)
(34717)
(69484)
30C
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I
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I
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I
I
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FIGURE 6.10 DBS EXPECTED INDEBTEDNESS - BASE CASE VS
LATER DSER SCENARIOS
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TABLE 6.13 NET PRESENT VALUE* (MILLIONS OF 1985 $)
AT VARIOUS DISCOUNT RATES
SCENARIO
BASE CASE
ION-THRUSTER
FIRST USER
lON-THRUSTER
LATER USER
10
DISCOUNT RATES
15 20 25 40
$(104.2) $(112.1) $(111.5) $(106.9) $ (87.4)
(101.0) (119.8) (124.6) (122.6) (103.0)
(68.6) (94.0) (103.5) (104.8) (91.4)
GaAs FIRST
USER
GaAs LATER
USER
(75.1)
(69.7)
(93.5)
(89.3)
(99.5)
(96.0)
(99.0)
(96.2)
(84.9)
(83.2)
( ) INDICATES A NEGATIVE NET EKESENT VALUE
* DISCOUNTED OVER YEARS ONE THROUGH FIFTEEN
6.5 Observations
Two technologies that could result from NASA technology
programs have been evaluated in terms of their effect the on the
financial performance of two typical coninuni cat ions satellite
business ventures. The analysis considered a fixed services
satellite business and a direct broadcast satellite business.
The FSS business is a reasonable business to begin with, one
that earns an attractive return on investment when utilizing a
satellite that does not employ the new technologies. Utilizing
satellites employing the two new technologies had a positive
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impact on the financial performance of this business, ii\
general. In the near-terra, large additional investments required
of the firm as a result of higher nonrecurring costs of
satellites employing the new technologies increase losses and
indebtedness relative to the base case. In the long-tenn the
effect of increased capacity resulting from incorporating the new/
technology into the satellites positively effect profits and
reduces indebtedness relative to the base case. When the
business is considered over the long-term, the return on
investment when the business uses the new technologies is better
than the base case. However, if the business is a first user of
the ion-thruster technology, the financial measures may not be
favorable enough to warrant the additional investment in the
near-term to achieve the long-term rewards. Investment in new
technology by a first user to achieve long-term enhanced
financial performance is uncertain, because the improvement in
long-term financial measures may not be sufficient if the first
user has to bear the nonrecurring costs after only a feasibility
demonstration phase by NASA. This may pose a hurdle that NASA
could only overcome by performing research and development beyond
the feasibility demonstration phase. NASA could reduce
nonrecurring costs to the first user by qualifying the prototype
satellite, producing a standard modular design and demonstrating
reliability.
The particular direct broadcast satellite business venture
selected for analysis was found to be unattractive as indicated
by the financial performance measures generated by the base case
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scenario. Although losses turn to profits within the fifteen
period evaluated, the net present value of cash flow is negative
at all of the considered discount rates, an indication that no
prudent investor would invest in that particular business. It is
hoped that the utilization of the new technology satellites with
increased capabilities would significantly after this situation.
Application of the new technologies caused improvements in profit
and indebtedness over the long-term, but was not of sufficient
*
benefit to transform the business into a viable one.
It most be emphasized that this analysis considered only two
representative business scenarios, as defined in the preceding
sections. Lnpacts of the new technology satellites may differ
when considering other business scenarios.
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7.—SPAQBGRAFT-HAPKE3S
7.1 ifelUfi QL Technology Programs
Net present value (NPV), the discounted stream of future
cash flews, is an accepted measure of project's worth to a
business. The difference between the NIV of two projects
provides a measure of the expected value of one investment
relative to the other.
The analyses described in the previous pages resulted in the
determination of the increase in the NPV that a typical venture
is likely to experience as a result of utilizing improved
technology satellites. Tte utilization of ion-thruster
satellites is expected to increase NPV by $25 to $40 million (at
a discount rate of 15%) relative to the base case. Utilization of
GaAs technology could increase NPV by $25 to $35 million (at a
discount rate of 15%).
These increments in NPV may be viewed as the benefits to a
typical firm of investment in the improved technology satellites.
As a first order approximation, these changes in NPV may be
extrapolated to the industry by multiplying the likelihood of a
business venture using the technology by the expected increase in
NPV of the business venture and the expected number of business
ventures that might utilize the improved technology satellites.
Estimating the number of businesses that could benefit fron
the improved technology satellites requires projections of supply
and derrand. Recently, several studies forecasting sharply
increasing transponder demand concluded that demand for
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TABLE 7.2 ESTIMATED DdAND FOR 36MHz EQUIVALENT TRANSPODERS
1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
TRANSPONDERS 1145 1655 1783 1911 2039 2168 2296 2424
transponders would exceed capacity in the 1990's. More recently
several factors have tempered this optimism and sane are
anticipating a transponder glut through the early nineties.
These factors include the potential competition of fiber optics,
the large projected supply of transponders (based on current and
approved capacity and satellite applications pending before the
FCC), and possibly an already existent oversupply (based on the
FOC's spot check of transponders in use [1]).
The number of businesses that will launch cannunications
satellites nay be estimated by (a) selecting demand forecast and
a supply forecast based on capacity that will be available using
current technology satellites and (b) determining the amount of
transponder capacity that will have to be available to fill
estimated excess demand that will emerge once the satellites
start to fail.
A recent NASA study [2] estimates the demand for 36 MHz
equivalent transponders for the years 1980, 1990 and 2000. Table
7.2 presents the demand forecast using the NASA estimates for
1990 and 2000 and interpolating linearly between the two points.
If all satellites that have been approved by, and are
currently pending before the FOC are actually launched, and if
these satellites and those currently en-orbit achieve their
159
PRQJBCTED-SUPPLy QF-DvSs—GOtOeiAL—SATELLITE
TRANSPONDERS (EQUIVALENT 36 MHz) 1995-2000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
TRANSPONDERS 1873 1830 1463 768 536 381
expected lifetimes, then there will be more than sufficent
capacity to fill the above demand forecast until 1995. Table
7.3 is a projection of transponder supply [1] based on current
satellites on-orbit, satellites currently approved by the FCC and
satellites that are still pending FCC approval under the current
round of applications.
Using the demand and supply forecasts described above, a
glut is foreseen through the mid-1990's. Around 1996 there will
begin to be a gap between supply and demand, considering supply
as defined above (and not including any satellites included in
a subsequent round of FCC filings). The present, current pending
and current approved capability will have started to fail, and
TABLE 7.4 SUPPLY AH) DEHAM) OF EQUIVALENT 36 KHZ TRANSPCNDERS
1995-2000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
TRANSPONDER
SUPPLY 1873 1830 1463 768 5367 381
TRANSPONDER
DEMAH) 1783 1911 2039 2168 2296 2424
EXCESS DEMAND -90 81 576 . 1400 1760 2043
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demand will continue to grow. At this point new satellites will
be constructed and launched to fill the gap. The lead time for
construction and launch and POC approval require the decision to
launch new satellites be made 4 or 5 years prior to launch.[1]
Therefore choices regarding satellite configuration and
technology will start to be made early in the nineties. The
technology must be available by then in order to be available for
inclusion into the next generation of satellites: those placed
into orbit after the current* group starts failing.
If the technology is available as early as 1991 the
following estimate may be made of the number of businesses that
would be able to utilize the technology. Table 7.4 indicates the
estijnated transponder demand and supply for the years 1995
through 2000. The difference between demand and supply ranging
from 81 transponders in 1996 to 2043 transponders in 2000, is
illustrated in Figure 7.1. If there are 20 transponders per
satellite, on average, about 100 satellites must be launched by
2000 to fill estimated demand.
Table 7.5 indicates the nunber of satellites per year that
would have to be launched to satisfy the excess demand. ' If a
typical business operates three to five satellites, then between
twenty and thirty-four ventures may benefit from the new
technology by placing satellites incorporating the new technology
into orbit in the 1996 - 2000 time frame.
* Current includes those pending now before the FCC - it is
assumed that design decisions have already been made on
these and that the new technology will not be ready by the
time most of this group is ready for launch.
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FIGURE 7.1 SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR EQUIVALENT
36MHz TRANSPOtCERS
The Iikelihocx3 that a business will choose to invest in the\
new technology is a function of the financial benefits likely to
result from the new technology and the cost of introducing the
technology. For instance, the likelihood that a business will
invest in the ion-thruster satellite as a first user, while
nonrecurring costs are still high, is much lower than the
likelihood of a business investing in the ion-thruster satellite
as a later user, after nonrecurring costs have been .reduced.
TABLE 7.5 NEW SATELLITES ON-ORBIT ANNUALLY TO FILL EXCESS DEMAND
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
NUMBER OF
SATELLITES 25 41 18 14
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As discussed in Section 6, if NASA only develops the
technology to the point of a feasibility demonstration phase, a
first user of the ion-thruster technology satellite may not find
the financial performance measures to be attractive enough to
invest in the technology. Nonrecurring costs are high, and the
ROI is not significantly better than that of the base case. Risk
may be perceived as higher than the base case because the
technology is as yet unproven.*
NASA may increase the likelihood of an initial investment in
ion-thruster technology by taking the research beyond the
feasibility demonstration phase. By qualifying the spacecraft
and producing a standard modular design, NASA can reduce
nonrecurring costs to the first user. Furthermore NASA might
influence perceived risk by reliability demonstrations. This
would reduce cost further because the satellite has been designed
with two propulsion systems - an ion propulsion system and a
chemical backup system: once the technology is proven the two
systems may not be necessary. Performance of this second phase
of research and development could then increase the chance'of the
increased net present value being realized by a number of
businesses because the likelihood of there being an initial
investment may be increased.
To illustrate, suppose that NASA only performs a feasibility
demonstration (phase 1). A first user may not find sufficient
* Although a chemical propulsion system is designed into the
satellite as backup, it does not provide the same
reliability as the base case satellite since it does not
have enough propellant to carry the satellite for the
entire design life.
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financial motivation to invest in the technology, and the
technology nay literally never get off the ground. If this is
the case the net present value increases will not be attained by
later users. The probability of there being a first user, and
therefore subsequent users is low.
If nonrecurring costs are reduced, there is a greater
likelihood that there will be a first user of the technology.
Consequently, there is also a greater likelihood that subsequent
businesses will also utilize the technology thereby achieving
increased NPV. If NASA undertakes a demonstration program (phase
2) aimed at reducing nonrecurring costs, the chances are greater
that these benefits will be realized.
Estimation of the effect of Phase 2 on NIV (extrapolated to
the industry) may be illustrated using the following simplified
model. Suppose that there are only first users and later users.
A first user represents the user who would bear the initial
nonrecurring costs if there were no Phase 2. Later users
represent either those investing after the first users or
represent all users if NASA undertakes Phase 2.
If Pi = probability of private sector investment in
technology if only Phase 1
APVl = the change in present value to the first user
of the technology (relative to the base case)
APV2 = the change in present value to the later users
(relative to the base case)
N = number of potential users
P2 = probability of private sector investment in
technology if Phase 1 and 2 programs are
undertaken by NASA.
The value of performing Phase 1 is:
PI * ( APV1 + (N - 1) * APV2)
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The benefit of performing both Phases 1 and 2 is:
P2 * (N * A PV2)
and the benefit of performing Phase 2 alone is:
(P2-P1) * N * A P V 2 + P1* U P V 2 - A PV1)
The value of P2 should be significantly greater than PI: the
likelihood of private sector investment in the technology is
increased by the government undertaking the second phase of the
research and development .
Assigning values to the variables based on results from the
analysis and guessing values for PI and P2 as follows:
PI = .1
P2 = .8
N =30
APV1 = $25 million
APV2 = $43 million
the value of Phase 1 would be $130 million, the value of Phases 1"
and would be $1030 million, and the value of Phase 1 alone would
be $900 million. It should be noted that the benefits depend
heavily upon P2 - PI. Thus over wide ranges of P2 and PL
significant benefits may be achieved by performing Phase 2.
7.2 Potential Jmpact on Imports and Exports
Most of the corrnercial conmunications satellites in orbit
have been supplied by U.S. companies. [3] Foreign countries have
recently been developing the capability to manufacture
ccmnunication satellites and U.S. manufacturers can expect to
face increasing competition from abroad. The Europeans have
advanced in the design and development of three-axis stabilized
spacecraft for connunications satellites. The development of the
European regional ccnrnuni cat ions satellite system, Eutelsat, was
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sponsored by the European Space Agency and the satellites were
built by a British multinational group with French, German and
Italian participation. Japan has already orbited a series of
communications satellites and is developing a new high capacity
satellite. [4]
The Europeans and Japanese have been developing Silicon and
Gallium Arsenide solar cells and intensive programs to develop
ion propulsion are underway in France and Germany. Even if the
U.S. does not develop improved technology in these two areas it
appears that the technology will be available: from foreign
sources.
The previous sections describe the effects of ion-thruster
and Gallium Arsenide technology on connunications satellite
business ventures using two particular spacecraft configurations:
the FSS venture was based on a Hughes spin stabilized Ku-band
satellite, and the DBS venture was based on a GE three-axis
stabilized satellite. The results presented indicate .that there
are likely to be benefits to fixed conrnunicatipns satellite
business ventures from using ion propulsion and Gallium Arsenide
solar cells. In the case of ion-thruster technology these,
benefits may only come about if NASA goes beyond the feasibility
demonstration phase to qualify the spacecraft, produce a standard
modular design and demonstrate reliability. With Gallium
Arsenide technology, the analysis showed that, based on the
particular business scenario analysed, improved financial
performance measures would result from application of the
technology by the first user of the technology after only a
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feasibility demonstration program by NASA. The specific benefits
will depend upon the particular business venture utilizing the
new technologies and the specific satellite configurations
enployed.
Improved technology (both ion-thruster and Gallium
Arsenide), on the other hand, did not have favorable enough
effects on the particular DBS venture that was analysed. This
particular venture was an unattractive one to begin with (it mist
be stressed here that this is not to say that other DBS
businesses may be financially untenable , but it is rather
because of the specific configuration that was used in the
analysis - a satellite with only three active transponders). Use
of the new technologies did not make the business a viable one.
The results therefore suggest that the specified ion-thruster and
Galliun Arsenide technology may not be profitably applied to the
higher power DBS satellites (since business ventures using the
considered satellite configuration may not be viable in their own
right).
Extrapolation from the limited developed data points to the
broad range of fixed conmunications satellite business ventures
leads to the conclusion that improved technology satellites
(i.e., incorporating ion propulsion and/or Gallium Arsenide solar
cells) would potentially have a conpetitive advantage on the
world market because of the positive effects such satellite cound
have on the financial performance of the businesses owning the
satellites. (As discussed above, this competitive advantage
would be more likely to result for ion-thruster technology if
nonrecurring costs could be brought down and high reliability
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demonstrated.) If the U.S. does not develop ion propulsion
technology and improved~solar cell^ whereas the Europeans or^
Japanese do, U.S. manufacturers may lose a portion of the world
satellite market to the competition.
Estimation of the size of the potential market "at risk" or
the market that the U.S. could lose if foreign technology
advances faster than U.S. technology may be approached as
follows. A study by Communications 21 [4] estimated planned
worldwide investment in ccnroercial comunications satellites.
Figure 7.2 illustrates the expected investment by area during
the years 1990 and 2000, according to the study. The study
listed past, present and expected future communications
satellites worldwide and indicated cost, country of owner and
contractor for the satellite (when available). Table 7.6 is an
example of information presented in the study. Estimates
resulting from this study may be high and may overestijnate the
actual market since many satellites listed after 1985 are not yet
under contract and it is not certain the satellites will be
launched.
Because the reported financial analysis indicated that the
considered new technologies may not sufficiently alter the
financial performance of the considered DBS businesses, the
market for DBS satellites was not considered part of the market
at risk.
Satellite purchases for which the satellite contractor was
already determined (for instance Intelsat will purchase three
satellites from Hughes for launch in 1992), were not considered
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part of the market the U.S. risks losing if the technology is not
developed by the U.S.
For many of the potential satellite purchases listed in
Reference 4 the contractor has not yet been determined, however.
Some of these potential markets would not be open to U.S.
manufacturers in any case because of nationalistic policies. In
Western Europe, camunications systems are operated by the
government postal-telephone-telegraph agencies which are
committed to buying nationally and American manufacturers are
therefore barred from the European market. (3] Since Europe is
likely to supply itself, Europe, including ESA and Eutelsat, is
not considered part of the market at risk.
Until recently Japanese policy, based on the country's Space
Development Principle, has been to protect its national space
industry and build up an advanced and competitive corrnercial
space industry with Japanese technology. In fact, the government
has allowed development and launch of Japanese spacecraft even if
more costly than U.S. spacecraft. 15] The Japanese governnent
has recently reversed this policy to accelerate purchase of U.S.
manufactured ccmnunications satellites. [6] In fact, joint
ventures are being formed in Japan to market American made
coranunications satellites. Space Connunication Corporation, for
example, (a joint venture between Mitsubishi Trading Corporation
and Mitusbishi Electric Corporation) plans to market Ford
Aerospace satellites. (7J Other events may further open Japanese
doors to U.S. ccmnunications satellites. Nippon Telegraph and
Telephone has just been denationalized. [8] Of even greater
import, Japan just decided to release a portion of the Ku-band
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-for dcrestic communications satellite operations-in—Japam—[-7-]—
Uhtil this decision there was little optimism concerning
potential U.S. inroads into the Japanese market because
communication satellites in Japan have been allocated Ka-band
frequencies (a snail amount of Ku-band has been used for
communications with foreign satellites). The U.S. would not have
been able to supply cost-carpetitive Ka-band satellites. [8]
Because of these developments it appears that the U.S. may
have more success than before in penetrating the Japanese market.
It could be assumed that the U.S. might capture 25% of the
Japanese market, if the relative technology levels were to remain
the same. If Japan is successful in developing advanced
technology the U.S. could lose this part of the market.
Therefore 25% of the potential Japanese market may be the market
at risk.
An examination of the buying patterns of countries revealed
that in recent years Brazil has purchased its satellites from the
Canadian manufacturer SPAR (which uses Hughes as a subcontractor)
and the Arab States have purchased fron the French company
Aerospat (to which Ford is a subcontractor). Canada has recently
purchased satellites [Anik-D] from the Canadian manufacturer,
SPAR. In these cases it will be assumed that a country that is
buying from a country that is developing the technology is not
part of the market at risk, because it would be lost to U.S.
manufacturers in any event. (Arabsat is an example) A country
like Brazil that has been purchasing from a country not
developing the technology is part of the market at risk, because
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if the U.S. developed the technology, this part of the market
might be captured. Finally, countries like Canada and the U.S.
that are purchasing from their own manufacturers could be
captured by foreign technology and therefore is considered part
of the market at risk.
Areas that have consistently purchased from the U.S. and
areas that had not committed to a contractor or shown trends
towards buying from one particular country (Africa) in the
Comnunications 21 study, were considered part of the market at
risk.
Intelsat purchases satellites competitively. In the past
three years U.S.manufacturers have represented about 80% of the
value of Intelsat purchases and foreign subcontractors to U.S.
companies about 20%. [9] Assuming that this trend would continue
if the relative competitiveness of U.S. satellites to foreign
manufactured satellites remained the same, the U.S. would risk
losing the 80% of the uncommitted Intelsat market if foreign
countries developed and produced the improved technology
satellites and the U.S. didn't.
Table 7.7 presents a rough estimate of the size of the
communication satellite market from 1990 through 2000 that could
be lost to U.S. manufacturers, if U.S. technology does not remain
competitive. The results are based on the Comnunications 21
study and the above assumptions. Indications are that the "at
risk" market, i.e., the satellite market that is likely to
gravitate with technology, is on the order of 4 to 5 billion
dollars in the 1990 to 2000 time frame.
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TABLE 7.7 AT RISK SATELLITE MARKET DURING
THE 1990 - 2000 TIME PERIOD^
COUNTRY/AGENCY
Intelsat
Asia
Japan
Latin
America
Africa
Inmarsat
U.S.
Canada
Total
MARKET
$1392 Million
200 Million
115 Million
290 Million
110 Million
176 Million
2,202 Million
277 Million
$4,762 Million
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8. CHEER APPLICATIONS CF METHODOLOGY
An objective of the reported effort was to develop an
economic evaluation and planning capability appropriate for the
evaluation of spacecraft technology programs such as space power
and on-orbit propulsion systems. As described in previous
sections of this report, the DOMSAT II Model is the cornerstone
of this capability. The DOMSAT II Model is a stochastic
financial simulation model that allows the impacts of S/C
technology programs to be evaluated for a broad range of
connunication satellite business ventures providing a
multiplicity of cccrounications services. The Model simulates the
performance of the business ventures explicitly and
quantitatively taking into account uncertainty, unreliability and
resulting risk.
•foe DOMSAT II Mpdel provides the means for evaluating S/C
program? antj space transporKat: ion programs and related
ppl icies in t^ f fms of their inpacts on the financial performance
of cjonnunications SfltSll JtE tJUfiln/RRS ventures .
The ability to model the financial performance of
coDiDunications satellite business scenarios together with the
specification of typical business scenarios, provides the means
for assessing the impacts of many public and private sector
programs and policies. It is possible to analyze many related
problems and issues with the assistance of the DOMSAT II Model.
Possible analyses include the following:
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Assessment of the iitpacts of undertaking a broad range
of S/C technology programs.
* Assessment of the intact of transportation system
technology programs such as the development of low
thrust upper stages for the transportation from LEO to
GBO.
* Comparison of the financial consequences of utilizing
alternative space transportation systems having
different mission modes (i.e., expendable vs.
reusable), reliability, accuracy of pay load placement,
price, etc.
* Assessment of transportation system pricing policies on
specific business scenarios to provide insight into the
likely consequences of transportation pricing policies
on investment decisions.
* Assessment of the impact of cost of insurance and
evaluation of the self-insurance alternative.
* Assessment of alternative S/C configurations, trans-
ponder arrangements and sparing concepts.
* Assessment of the potential market for upper stages
(and associated pricing policy) in terms of the impact
of the attributes of the stage on the financial
performance of connunications satellite business
ventures.
All of the above may be accomplished directly by altering the
input data set so as to reflect the technology attributes or
policy issues of concern. For example, the effect of Space
Shuttle pricing policy may be assessed by altering the
transportation system price as a function of time. The financial
impacts, assuming that transportation system price adjustments
are not passed on to the consumer, can be observed by direct
comparison of the financial performance measures with those of
the base case scenario. The consequences of passing on the price
adjustments to the consumers can be observed by adjusting
transponder prices and including elasticity estimates.
176
REFERENCES
Section 1
1. Greenberg, J.S., Economic Considerations, New Space
Transportation Systems, An AIAA. ftssffpsn\MTtr edited by J.P.
Layton and J. Grey, AIM Report, January 1983.
2. Greenberg, J.S., The Economics of Spacecraft
Standardization, Transactions of £b£ 20th Annual fleeting cf
The American Nuclear Societyf June 1974.
3. Greenberg, J.S. and G.A. Hazelrigg, Methodology for
Reliability-Cost-Risk Analysis of Satellite Networks,
Journal of. Spacecraft and. Rocketsf Vblune II, No. 9,
September 1974.
4. Greenberg, J.S., Evaluating the Economic Impact of Design
Alternatives on Domestic Comnunication Satellite Ventures,
Paper No. IAF-78-A-38, 29th International Astronautical
Federation Congress, Dubrovnik, October 1978.
5. Greenberg, J.S., Risk Analysis, Astronautics and
Aeronautics, November 1974.
6. Greenberg, J.S., Investment Decisions! The Influence of
Risk and Other Factors. American Management Associations,
1982.
7. Greenberg, J.S., Luring Gonpanies Across the Frontiers of
Technology, Astronautics and Aeronauticsf June 1982.
8. Nichols, R. and J.S. Greenberg, Economic Impact of New
Technology on Domestic Satellite Coraruni cat ions, AMS Report
No. 1285, The Aerospace Systems Laboratory, Princeton
University, March 31, 1976.
Section 2
1. In the Matter of the Application of GTE Satellite
Corporation for Authorization to Launch and Operate A Third
GST&R Domestic Satellite and to Operate up to Eight
Transponders on this Satellite on a Non-Conmon Carrier
Basis, Amended Application, File No. 20S4-DSS-LA-82,
Noveiber 7, 1983.
2. GTE Satellite Comnunication, Technical Characteristics,
GSTAR.
3. Morgan, Walten, and Petrcnchak, Margaret, Satellite
Goranunications, Satellite Performance Reference Chart-1984.
177
4. Prentiss, S., Satellite nnmnmicationgf Tab Books, 1983.
5. Application of GTE Satellite Corporation to Construct a
Fourth GSTAR Satellite as a Ground Spare for its Authorized
Satellite System, Amended Application, File No. 2085-DSS-P-
82, November 1, 1983.
6. Fact Sheet: RCA American Pmpgtir Satellite System. RCA
News, April 1983.
7. Fact Sheet: RCA Sateen Domestic Communications Satellite
(RCA Satcon IV) , January 1982.
8. Braun, W.H. and Keigler, J.E., Advanced Satcon: RCA's Next-
Generation Domestic Satellite System, RCA, 1980.
9. Second Advanced RCA Satcon Satellite Scheduled for April
Launch, RCA News, April 1983.
10. Fr eel ing, M.R. and Weinrich, A.W., RCA Advanced Satcoro: The
First All-Solid-State Communications Satellite, Satellite
Circuit. No. 2, April 1984.
11. RCA Heritage in Comrunications Satellites, RCA Astro.
12. Application for Advanced Fixed Service Coranunications
Satellites, Volume 2, RCA, September 15, 1983.
13. Morgan, Walter., RCA Satcon 14/12 GHz Satellites, Satellite
Notebook 134, Satellite Connmnications, February 1984.
14. Churan, G.G. and Leavitt, W.E., CTR Notes, Sunrnary of the
SBS Satellite Conrounications Performance Specifications,
Comsat Technical Review, Volume II, No. 2, Fall 1981.
15. Fact Sheet: Space and Communications Group, SBS Hughes
Aircraft Company.
16. Application for Authority to Construct a Sixth Ku -Band
Conmunications Satellite as a Replacement Spacecraft,
Satellite Business Systems, File No. l-DSS-P-83.
17. Satellite System Application, Applications of American
Satellite Company for a Domestic Communication Satellite
System, American Satellite Company, December 16, 1981.
18. American Satellite Company Amendment of Application for
Authority to Construct, Launch and Operate its Third
Domestic Communications Satellite.
19. Application for Authority to Launch and Operate its Third
Domestic Conmunications Satellite, American Satellite
Company.
173
20. Application of American Satellite Conpany for ASC-4 and
ASC-5, November 7, 1983.
21. RCA Astro Electronics, Satellites and Space Systems.
22. Fact Sheet: Space and Communications Group, Anik D, Hughes
Aircraft Company.
23. Pact Sheet: Space and Coonunications Group, Anik C, Hughes
Aircraft Conpany.
24. Fact Sheet: Space and Coonunications Group, for Comstar I,
Hughes Aircraft Conpany.
25. Skynet Services Customer Service, Information, Technical
Parameters and Operational Procedures.
26. Application of Comsat General Corporation for Authority to
Construct, launch and Operate 12/14 GHz Satellites and to
Construct and Operate Related TT&C Earth Station
Facilities, November 7, 1983.
27. Equatorial Communications Company, FCC Filing.
28. The Ford Family of Satellites, Ford Aerospace and
Ccramunication Corporation.
29. S. Frutkin, Ford Aerospace has a Better Idea: Super sat,
Satft^  1 itift Cormm\jraMonsf February 1984.
30. Amendment to the Application of Ford Aerospace Satellite
Services Corporation for a U.S. Communications Satellite
System, November, 1983.
31. Fact Sheet: Space and Communications Group, Galaxy, Hughes
Aircraft Company.
32. GTE Spacenet Technical Characteristics, GTE Spacenet
Corporation.
33. Application of GTE Spacenet Corporation to Launch and
Operate a Fourth Domestic Communications Satellite, GTE
Spacenet Corporation, November 7, 1983.
34. Fact Sheet: Space and Communications Group, Ttelstar 3,
Hughes Aircraft Company.
35. Application for Authority to Construct and Operate a
Domestic Satellite Communication System, U.S. Satellite
Systems, Inc.
36. USAT, United States Satellite Systems, Inc.
37. Western Union News; Westar Satellite Backgrounder, April
1984.
179
38. Fact Sheet; Space and Communications Group, Vtestar ly/V/VI,
Bughes Aircraft Conpany.
39. Application of Satellite Television Corporation for a
Satellite-to-Borae Subscription Television Service, Volute
III, Comprehensive System Description, December 17, 1980.
40. Pattan, B., Revisions to DBS Applications (Post RARC-83)
and New Applications, FOC.
41. Application for Authorization of a Direct Broadcast
Satellite Connunicaticns System, Requested for Amendment of
Application, RCA, July 3, 1984.
42. Direct Broadcast Satellite, prepared for National Christian
Network, Inc., by RCA Astro Electronics, January 4, 1984.
43. Application of Direct Broadcast Satellite Corporation for a
Direct Broadcast Satellite system Overview, General Docket
No. 80-603, July 16, 1981.
44. Application for Modification of Construction Permit
Regarding Changes to Conform with RARC-83 and Changes in
Equity Ownership, January 5, 1983, Direct Broadcast
Satellite Corporation.
45. Amendment to: Direct Broadcast Satellite Application FCC
81-08, Video Satellite Systems, Inc., November 11, 1983.
46. Application of National Exchange, Inc. for Authority to
Construct and Operate a Direct Broadcast Satellite System,
January 12, 1984.
47. Application of Advanced Communications Corporation for
Authority to Construct and Operate a Direct Broadcast
Satellite System, January 12, 1984.
Section 4
1. Matsuda, S., et al., "Development of Ultrathin Si Solar
Cells," Proceedings of. ihfi Hth TEPP. Photovoltaic
Specialists Conference. 1984, pp. 123-127.
2. Matsuda, S., et al., "Development of AlGaAs/GaAs Solar
Cells with Space Qualifications," Proceedings of ihfi 12th.
TFPF. Photovol tfl 1C Sfrftfifll Ifitfi Conferencef 1984, pp. 97-102.
3. Vieleers, A.M.V., "A New Generic Range of Advanced Rigid
Solar Arrays for Space Applications," Proceedings QL £h£
17th TEEE Photovoltaic Specialists Conferencef 1984, pp.
310-314.
180
4. Bogus, K., "Technology Components of Solar Arrays for Space
Platforms/" fgocpe^ ings of the j,6th Tfff.
ist Conference. 1982, pp. 13-20.
5. Ahmed, S., et al., "Canadian Solar Array Developments for
Space Applications," Canadian Astronautics and Space
Journal, Volume 30, No. 1, March 1984, pp. 3-14.
6. Tabata, J., "Electric Propulsion Activities in Japan,"
International Electric Propulsion Conference Paper 84-17,
Toyko, Janpan, Kay 1984.
Section 7
1. £$£££, Volume I, Number 3, Shearson Lehman American
Express, December 1984.
2. Stevenson, S. , Poley W. , Lekan J., and Salzman J., Demand
for Satellite-Provided Domestic Connunications Services,
NASA Lewis Research Center, November 1984.
3. "Satellite Connunications," Aerospace
 f Aerospace Industries
Association.
4. Filep &., Schnapf A., and Fordyce S. , World Connunications
Satellite Market Characteristics and Forecast,
Coranunication 21 Corporation, November 1983.
5. "Users Challenging Policies of Japan, " Aviation fifeejl did
. Space Technology. June 25, 1984.
6. "Japanese Approved Domestic Satellite Operation in Ku-
Band," Aviation Week and Space Technology, April 15, 1985.
7. "Japanese Firms Team to Market U.S. Satellites," Aviation
Week and Space Technology. April 8, 1985.
8. "Japan's Doors Opening?1 Sjatfll itP Conimnicat 1 ons
 f May
1985.
9. Private Goranunication with P. Jackson, Intelsat Affairs,
Comsat.
131
1. Report No.
NASA CR-174978
2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No.
4. Title and Subtitle
Evaluation of Spacecraft Technology Programs
(Effects on Communication Satellite Business
Ventures) - Volume I
5. Report Date
September 1985
6. Performing Organization Code
7. Authors;
Joel S. Greenburg, Carole Gaellck, Marshall
Kaplan, Janls Flshman, and Charles Hopkins
8. Performing Organization Report No.
None
10. Work Unit No.
9. Performing Organization Name and Address
Econ, Inc.
1800 Diagonal Road, Suite 290
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
11. Contract or Grant No.
NAS 3-23886
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Washington, D.C. 20546
13. Type of Report and Period Covered
Contractor Report
14. Sponsoring Agency Code
506-62-22
15. Supplementary Notes
Final Report. Project Manager, Karl A. Faymon, Power Technology Division, NASA
Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio 44135. Joel S. Greenburg, Carole Gaellck,
and Janls Flshman, Princeton Synergetics, Inc., Princeton, New Jersey 08540;
Marshall Kaplan, Spacetech Inc., P.O. Box 1109, State College, Pennsylvania
16801; Charles Hopkins. Econ, Inc., San Jose. California 95117.
16. Abstract
Commercial organizations as well as government agencies Invest 1n spacecraft (S/C)
technology programs that are aimed at Increasing the performance of communica-
tions satellites. The value of these programs must be measured 1n terms of their
Impacts on the financial performance of the business ventures that may ultimately
utilize the communications satellites. An economic evaluation and planning capa-
bility has been developed and used to assess the Impact of NASA on-orb1t propul-
sion and space power programs on typical fixed satellite service (FSS) and direct
broadcast service (DBS) communications satellite business ventures. Typical FSS
and DBS spin and three-axis stabilized spacecraft were configured 1n the absence
of NASA technology programs. These spacecraft were reconfigured taking Into
account the anticipated results of NASA specified on-orb1t propulsion and space
power programs. In general, the NASA technology programs resulted 1n spacecraft
with Increased capability. This report describes the developed methodology for
assessing the value of spacecraft technology programs 1n terms of their Impact on
the financial performance of communication satellite business ventures. Results
of the assessment of NASA specified on-orb1t propulsion and space power technology
programs are presented for typical FSS and DBS business ventures. This report
consists of two volumes. Volume 1 describes the methodology and contains the
results of the analyses performed for the on-orb1t propulsion and space power
technology programs. Volume 2 contains appendices describing the DOMSAT II Model
and data base and Includes user and programmer documentation.
17. Key Words (Suggested by Author(s))
Communications satellites; On-orb1t
propulsion; Gallum arsenide solar cel ls ;
Economic analyses
19. Security Classif. (of this report)
Unclassif ied
18. Distribution Statement
Unclassif ied
STAR Category
20. Security Classif. (of this page)
Unclassified
- unlimited
32
21. No. of pages
185
22. Price*
A09
"For sale by the National Technical Information Service. Springfield, Virginia 22161
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Lewis Research Center
Cleveland. Ohio 44135
Official Business
Penalty (or Private Use $300
SECOND CLASS MAIL
ADDRESS CORRECTION REQUESTED
Postage and Fees Paid
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
NASA-451
NASA
